Disappearing Discounts: Hedge Fund Activism in Conglomerates by Kim, Sehoon
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Disappearing Discounts: Hedge Fund
Activism in Conglomerates
Kim, Sehoon
University of Florida
9 March 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100876/
MPRA Paper No. 100876, posted 05 Jun 2020 10:23 UTC
Disappearing Discounts:
Hedge Fund Activism in Conglomerates
Sehoon Kim∗
University of Florida
March, 2020
Abstract
Hedge fund activism removes the diversification discount in targeted conglomerate
firms. Targeted conglomerates increase investment in segments with better growth op-
portunities, while reducing each division’s over-reliance on their own cash flow relative
to their reliance on cash flows from other segments. These improvements are stronger
when firms are ex-ante financially constrained, when CEOs are subsequently replaced
by outsiders, and when payout is subsequently increased. Refocusing is no more valu-
able than increasing internal efficiency. The results are not driven by mean reversion.
The results are consistent with hedge funds’ skill in unlocking the value of internal
capital markets in diversified firms.
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1 Introduction
Conglomerates are at the center of a long-lived debate in corporate finance, namely whether
they are valued less than what their divisions would be worth on a standalone basis, and
whether this discount can be attributed to inefficient investment allocations across their di-
visions (see Lang and Stulz (1994); Berger and Ofek (1995); Shin and Stulz (1998); Rajan,
Servaes, and Zingales (2000); Scharfstein and Stein (2000); Lamont and Polk (2002)). Nu-
merous studies dispute whether this observed “diversification discount” may be accounted
for by alternative explanations ranging from optimal firm behavior to measurement errors.1
In this paper, I use hedge fund activism as a unique laboratory to help address this question,
by studying changes in the diversification discount of conglomerates and their divisional
investment allocations in response to activist campaigns.
As external monitors with high-powered incentives, activist hedge funds have been shown
to be successful in improving targeted firms along many dimensions, including short-term
stock returns, long-term operating performance, productivity, product market outcomes, and
innovation (see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); Boyson and Mooradian (2011);
Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015); Aslan and Kumar (2016); Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2018)).
Based on such findings, I hypothesize that hedge fund activism would have an impact on the
diversification discount and internal allocative efficiency of conglomerates if they are ex-ante
inefficient as debated in the literature. As sharp external impetus to firms that are unlikely
to be correlated with measurement errors in observed metrics of the diversification discount,
hedge fund activism is a promising setting to infer the nature of the diversification discount
based on changes brought by hedge funds’ skill in unlocking the value in conglomerates.
Using schedule 13D filings supplemented with manual Factiva news search to identify
hedge fund activism events targeting conglomerate firms, I begin by documenting that ac-
1Such explanations include optimal firm behavior (see Matsusaka (2001); Matsusaka and Nanda (2002);
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002, 2013); Gomes and Livdan (2004)), reduction in risk and uncertainty (see
Mansi and Reeb (2002); Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010)), suboptimal distribution of rents from efficient
production outcomes (see Schoar (2002)), or selection and measurement errors (see Whited (2001); Campa
and Kedia (2002); Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002); Villalonga (2004a, b); Custo´dio (2014)).
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tivist hedge funds have been increasingly targeting large and diversified conglomerate firms
over the past few decades. Next, I employ a difference-in-differences framework to analyze
the impact of hedge fund activism on the diversification discount and divisional investment
efficiency of conglomerates. I find that the diversification discount disappears after conglom-
erates are targeted by hedge funds, whereas non-targeted matched conglomerates continue
to deteriorate in comparison (see Figure 1). This result is robust to alternative measures
of the diversification discount introduced in the literature addressing selection issues and
measurement errors (see Custo´dio (2014); Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018)).
While I document that the diversification discount diminishes with hedge fund activism,
a natural question is: What mechanism drives this finding? I show that targeted conglomer-
ates improve the efficiency of their divisional investment allocations. Targeted firms increase
investment in divisions with good investment opportunities, and these divisions become less
reliant on their own cash flows in funding their investments. As a result, the marginal re-
turn on capital becomes more equalized across divisions within targeted firms (see Figure 2).
These improvements are stronger for firms that are financially constrained prior to being
targeted, and for firms that experience CEO turnovers by outsiders subsequent to being
targeted, consistent with ex-ante inefficiencies arising from internal power struggles among
divisional managers over limited corporate resources (see Xuan (2009); Ozbas and Scharf-
stein (2010); Duchin and Sosyura (2013)). Importantly, I find no evidence that these results
are driven by corporate refocusing, indicating that the value created by hedge fund activism
goes beyond what can be attained by structural reorganization (see Bethel, Liebeskind, and
Opler (1998); Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003)). In fact, the effects of hedge fund activism
on the diversification discount and internal investment allocation are at least equally strong
for targeted firms that do not refocus compared to targeted firms that do. The results
are robust to a host of alternative specifications of Tobin’s q and segment level investment
opportunities, mitigating concerns of measurement errors. Overall, the results support the
inefficiency-based explanation for the diversification discount, and highlights the positive
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role of hedge fund activism in improving the internal efficiency of conglomerates.
Although hedge fund activism serves as a shock to targeted firms, they are not exogenous
because firms with certain characteristics that are correlated their diversification discounts
are likely to be targeted. It is important to note, however, that it is precisely of interest
that activist hedge funds should choose targets that have underlying inefficiencies that man-
ifest in a diversification discount, so that their campaigns may add value by resolving such
problems. I show that targeted conglomerates have poorer performance (e.g., ROA or sales
growth) than their matched counterparts prior to being targeted. Insofar as activist hedge
funds do not merely pick such firms that inevitably and automatically revert to their mean
without any intervention, such selection is not a confounding factor for this study. Assuring
that this is not the case, I find no evidence of mean reversion in the diversification discount
that could be driving the effects of hedge fund activism in my sample. The persistence in the
effects of hedge fund activism over the subsequent three years after targeting also alleviates
concerns that discounted conglomerates may simply have higher future returns regardless of
activism (see Lamont and Polk (2001)).
The central hypothesis of this study that hedge fund activism should affect the value dis-
count and efficiency of conglomerates is grounded not only in the idea that hedge funds could
influence firm investment policies directly, but more importantly in the fact that they are
often concerned with improving corporate governance. In fact, over one third of hedge fund
activism campaigns explicitly state improving governance as their main objectives, while
one eighth state operational efficiency as their explicit goal (see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and
Thomas (2008)).2 Thus, it is plausible that their successes would alleviate agency problems
2An anecdotal example of the objectives and effects of hedge fund activism is the case of Pershing Square
Capital Management, a leading activist hedge fund led by Bill Ackman, and Canadian Pacific Railway,
a major railroad company in which the hedge fund acquired a 14% stake at the end of 2011. In early
2012, Pershing Square launched an activist campaign, pushing for changes in the company. The complaints
were focused on the lack of operating efficiency, low asset utilization, substantial underinvestment, failed
acquisitions, and sluggish market share growth. The hedge fund argued that the incumbent CEO and the
CEO-friendly board were inept at addressing such problems, and pushed for change of management with the
full support of the shareholders of the company. After the new CEO Hunter Harrison and board members
chosen by the fund were brought in, significant operational improvements took place, including substantially
more investment allocations to segments with high growth opportunities such as intermodal services and the
3
and intra-firm divisional power struggles often cited as the roots of inefficient capital allo-
cation across divisions within conglomerates (see Servaes (1996); Denis, Denis, and Sarin
(1997); Shin and Stulz (1998); Lins and Servaes (1999); Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000);
Scharfstein and Stein (2000); Gertner, Powers, Scharfstein (2002); Lamont and Polk (2002);
Xuan (2009); Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010); Duchin and Sosyura (2013); Glaser, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Sautner (2013)). For example, hedge funds may indirectly affect the efficiency
of internal capital markets by severing CEO-divisional manager ties through CEO turnovers,
or by disciplining managers through increased payout of the firm’s excess cash (see Brav,
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); Klein and Zur (2009); Boyson and Mooradian (2011)).
Whichever the underlying mechanism may be, one would expect the efficiency of conglom-
erates to improve as a result of hedge fund activism, if conglomerates are indeed inefficient
prior to being targeted.
By showing that the observed diversification discount and allocative inefficiency in con-
glomerates largely disappear after they are targeted by activist hedge funds, this paper lends
support to the idea that diversified firms are ex-ante inefficient and therefore valued at a
discount, providing new insights into the valuations and operations of conglomerate firms.
Alternative views in the literature have long challenged this assertion, arguing that the em-
pirically observed diversification discount and internal capital allocations are consistent with
optimal firm behavior (see Matsusaka (2001); Matsusaka and Nanda (2002); Maksimovic
and Phillips (2002, 2013); Gomes and Livdan (2004)), reduction of risk and uncertainty
about the firm’s prospects (see Mansi and Reeb (2002); Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010)),
suboptimal dissipation of rents from efficient production outcomes (see Schoar (2002)), or
selection biases and measurement errors (see Whited (2001); Campa and Kedia (2002); Gra-
ham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002); Villalonga (2004a, b); Custo´dio (2014)). In the absence
of any inefficiency in the way resources are allocated within conglomerates, interventions by
activist hedge funds should have little impact on how diversified firms are valued relative
firm’s rail network covering North Dakota’s Bakken shale region. From September 2011 to December 2014,
Canadian Pacific’s stock price rose from around $49 to $220.
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to pure-play firms and how they use their internal resources. To the contrary, I document
significant shifts in their relative valuations and resource allocations following activist cam-
paigns, implying that hedge funds view their target companies as inefficient ex-ante.
While the change in the diversification discount (i.e., increase in excess q) in response to
hedge fund activism is robust to several measures of the discount introduced in the literature,
the level of the discount varies across these measures. For instance, the ex-ante discount
estimated without using information of single segment firms via quantile regressions as sug-
gested by Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018) is neither negative nor large in magnitude. It
is therefore possible to interpret the results differently, namely that diversification adds value
through the creation of internal capital markets, but that agency problems prevent conglom-
erates from fully realizing this potential. Several studies indeed show that conglomerate
headquarters can engage in “winner picking” strategies (see Stein (1997); Khanna and Tice
(2001)). This “bright side” of internal capital market can, for example, help alleviate division
level credit constraints and lessen the impact of financial dislocations (see Campello (2002);
Cremers, Huang, and Sautner (2011); Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007, 2014); Matvos and
Seru (2014); Matvos, Seru, and Silva (2018)), or promote efficient allocation of labor (see
Tate and Yang (2015)). Nonetheless, the evidence I present is consistent at the very least
with the ability of activist hedge funds in unlocking the value of internal capital markets
buried in inefficient target conglomerates.
This study also contributes to the literature on shareholder activism, and hedge fund
activism in particular. Earlier studies cast doubt on the effectiveness of activist campaigns
in the 1980-1990s carried out by institutional shareholders such as mutual funds and pension
funds (see Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996); Smith (1996); Wahal (1996); Gillan and
Starks (2000)). However, the activism landscape has recently changed with the advent of
activist hedge funds. Several papers document positive short-term stock returns and long-
term operational improvements from hedge fund activism, such as higher profitability and
CEO turnover (see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); Boyson and Mooradian (2011);
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Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015)). These findings have spurred studies examining the real
effects of hedge fund activism on various aspects of corporate activity such as productivity,
product market competition, and innovation (see Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015); Aslan and
Kumar (2016); Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2018)), and the implications for different stake-
holders of targets (see Sunder, Sunder, and Wongsunwai (2014)). The impact of hedge fund
activism is also largely observed across different countries (see Becht, Franks, Grant, and
Wagner (2017)), and has been shown to have preventive spillover effects on non-targeted
peer firms as well (see Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira (2019)). Studies have found that
such positive effects are made possible by activist experience and expertise (see Krishnan,
Partnoy, and Thomas (2016); Boyson, Ma, and Mooradian (2019)), institutional ownership,
trading, and voting (see Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015); Gantchev and Jotikasthira
(2018); Brav, Jiang, Li, and Pinnington (2019)), and private engagements or settlements
(see Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009); McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016); Be-
bchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2019)).3 4 Overall, the evidence in the literature bolsters
my motivation for using hedge fund activism to investigate the diversification discount in
conglomerates. My findings contribute to this literature by highlighting the real effects of
hedge fund activism on an important segment of the economy comprised of large diversified
firms, which has long been of key interest in corporate finance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the data and sample
used for this study. In Section 3, I analyze the effects of hedge fund activism on conglomerate
firms. Finally, I conclude in Section 4.
3However, it is not always the case that hedge fund activism succeeds. Boyson and Pichler (2019) docu-
ment that targets often fight back, leading to negative market reactions and worse operating performances
when activists do not counter-resist such hostile resistance.
4In many cases, the returns to hedge fund activism are also attributable to financial strategies. Notably,
activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by facilitating acquisitions
of their targets at favorable terms (see Greenwood and Schor (2009); Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani
(2017); Jiang, Li, and Mei (2018); Corum and Levit (2019)).
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2 Data and Sample Overview
2.1 Data
2.1.1 Conglomerates
The sample of conglomerates and their industry segments is constructed from the Compustat
business segment files. FASB No. 14 and SEC Regulation S-K require firms to report audited
footnote information for business segments whose sales, assets, or profits comprise more than
10% of the firm’s consolidated totals. In June of 1997, FASB No. 14 was superseded by
FASB No. 131, under which firms are required to report such segment data insofar as “it is
used internally for evaluating segment performance and deciding how to allocate resources
to segments”. The Compustat segment database reports segment information based on this
requirement.5 I start by requiring firms to have positive assets and sales greater than or
equal to $10 million, and segments to contain complete information on net sales, identifiable
total assets, capital expenditures, operating profit or loss, depreciation, and SIC code. I
exclude firms with financial (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) or governmental (SIC codes 9000 to
9999) segments.
I follow standard screening procedures in the literature to deal with well known data
issues in the Compustat segment files (see Berger and Ofek (1995); Shin and Stulz (1998);
Billett and Mauer (2003)). To address the issue that firms may not fully allocate accounting
items across reported segments, I require the sum of segment sales (assets) to be within
1% (25%) of firm totals, after which I apply a multiple to explicitly allocate unallocated
sales, assets, capital expenditure, and cash flow. In addition, to minimize the effects of
firms reorganizing their segments over time, I require the following ratios not to exceed one:
segment net capital expenditure (gross capital expenditure minus depreciation) to segment
assets, other segment net capital expenditure to other segment assets, segment sales growth,
5To ensure that the reporting requirement change does not affect the results of the paper, I redo the
analysis using the sample period beginning with the fiscal year 1998 so that all variables use data strictly
after the change occurred. The results are virtually unchanged.
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segment cash flow to segment assets, and other segment cash flow to other segment assets.
Finally, to ensure a sample of truly diversified firms, I require firms to have at least two
segments serving different 2 digit SIC industries and further exclude firms in which the
segments with the smallest and largest sales are in the same industry.6
2.1.2 Hedge Fund Activism
The sample of hedge fund activism events are identified using Schedule 13D filings (i.e.,
beneficial ownership reports) submitted to the SEC, complemented with a manual search of
Factiva news archives for media coverage on conglomerate firms targeted by activist hedge
funds. Section 13(d) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act stipulates that investors who (1)
own more than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities and (2) intend to in-
fluence control of the issuer must disclose the amount and intent of ownership within 10
days of acquiring such a stake. The investor can file a shorter 13G filing in lieu of a 13D in
the absence of the intent to control, which implies that a Schedule 13D filing meaningfully
indicates an active intervention to follow. 13D filers are narrowed down to hedge fund man-
agers based on the identity descriptions of the reporting entities. I then supplement the 13D
sample with a list of hedge fund activism events identified by a comprehensive Factiva news
search for all firms in the Compustat conglomerate sample described above. The sample
of hedge fund activism events targeting conglomerate firms covers the period from 1994 to
2014.
Table 1 summarizes the sample of hedge fund activism events. Over time, Panel A shows
that there is pro-cyclical variation amid a gradual upward trend in hedge fund activism tar-
geting conglomerate firms, in terms of the number of targeted firms and campaigns, and also
6While I focus on the implications of industrial diversification in this paper, the literature has shown
that geographical (i.e., global) diversification also leads to similar conglomerate discounts (see Denis, Denis,
and Yost (2002)). In the Appendix, I show that the baseline result of this paper (i.e., the effect of hedge
fund activism on the diversification discount) holds similarly for conglomerates that are only industrially
diversified and for those that are both industrially as well as geographically diversified, indicating that
geographical diversification neither amplifies nor dampens the effect of hedge fund activism on industrial
conglomerates (see Table A.2).
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the average target’s asset size. During the sample period, there are 137 unique conglomerate
firms targeted by 148 activist campaigns. While the number of events are smaller compared
to previous studies, they are economically significant. Targeted conglomerate firms have on
average $2.3 billion in total assets and 2.7 industry segments, adding up to $346 billion in
targeted assets over the entire sample.7 Panel B shows the industry distribution of targeted
firms. The largest number of targeted conglomerates are manufacturing firms, with consumer
nondurables, telecommunications, and chemical product industries representing important
portions of the sample as well.
2.2 Measurement
2.2.1 Diversification Discount
Measuring the diversification discount has been a fundamental challenge in the conglom-
erates literature (see Whited (2001); Villalonga (2004a, b)). Instead of trying to directly
correct for measurement errors, I use hedge fund activism as external shocks to explain
changes in the diversification discount of conglomerates, under the assumption that such
measurement errors should not be correlated with within-firm variation in activist targeting.
Nonetheless, I employ a number of different methods identified in the literature to measure
the diversification discount to ensure the results of the analysis are robust to correcting for
measurement errors.
Following early studies (see Lang and Stulz (1994); Berger and Ofek (1995)), I start
by computing the conglomerate firm’s diversification discount as its Excess q, which is the
difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q and its synthesized q′ imputed from the standalone q
of each of its segments, where segment q is approximated by the average q of single segment
firms in the same 2 digit SIC industry as the segment.8 The conglomerate firm’s imputed q′
7The sample of hedge fund activism in Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015) includes 368 firms with $1.1 billion
on average in total assets. The sample used in Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2018) covers 553 firms with
average total assets of $0.7 billion.
8The results throughout the paper are robust to approximating segment q with either the median or
asset-weighted average q of single segment firms in the same industry
is then computed as the weighted average of its segment qs, where segment assets are used
as weights. The intuition of this approach is to use the conglomerate’s imputed q′ as an
estimate of what the “sum of each part” would be worth if each segment were its own entity
instead of the firm’s division. The difference between the conglomerate’s q and q′ would then
capture the value added or discounted due to the internal allocation under conglomeration.
While this “chop-shop” approach has been used routinely in the diversification literature
to overcome the issue that divisional segments do not have market values, it is subject to
biases arising from measurement errors around Tobin’s q (see Whited (2001)). First, ob-
servable measures of Tobin’s q can diverge from marginal q, the unobservable measure of
investment opportunities implied by standard intertemporal models of investment. For ex-
ample, goodwill accounting in mergers and acquisitions may induce a downward bias in q for
acquisitive conglomerates, resulting in an upward bias in the magnitude of the diversifica-
tion discount (see Custo´dio (2014)). Following Custo´dio (2014), I adjust q for this goodwill
accounting bias by subtracting goodwill from book assets, and use this to compute Goodwill
Adjusted Excess q. The results throughout the paper are robust to using this alternative
Excess q variable.
Setting aside potential biases in q itself, there is an additional source of measurement
error coming from the fact that divisional segments of conglomerates may not be comparable
to single segment firms in the same industry, even if their qs are measured accurately. In
other words, the reliance on single segment firms may introduce a bias in imputed q′, and
thus in Excess q as well. Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018) introduce a new method to
address this issue that inverts the “chop-shop” approach and does not rely on single seg-
ment firms. Each year, a cross-sectional quantile regression is run without intercept, fitting
conglomerate qs onto their divisional sales exposure to each of the 10 Fama-French indus-
tries. The coefficients from these regressions produce annual estimates of the median q for
conglomerate divisions in each industry. I use this method to compute another alternative
measure of Excess q, henceforth denoted as BDS Excess q.
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To ensure robustness throughout the paper, I analyze the effect of hedge fund activism
on the diversification discount in conglomerates using each of the three measures described
above: Excess Tobin’s q, Goodwill Adjusted Excess q, and BDS Excess q. It is important to
note again, however, that the approach of focusing on the changes in conglomerates around
the external impetus of hedge fund activism helps interpret the diversification discount and
internal allocative efficiency unencumbered by measurement errors.
2.2.2 Segment Investment Efficiency
A related and equally difficult challenge in studies of internal capital market efficiency has
been the measurement of segment investment opportunities and cross-divisional investment
subsidies. For example, using lagged Tobin’s q to explain current investment by a division
suffers from the same measurement error in segment q described above. In my analysis of
the impact of hedge fund activism on segment investment efficiency, I use as measures of
segment investment opportunities the average Tobin’s q of single segment firms in the same
industry adjusted for goodwill accounting (see Custo´dio (2014)). As an alternative, I also
use segment sales growth to avoid measurement of segment q altogether. These measures
are lagged by one year and then used to classify segments as having above or below average
- or alternatively highest or lowest - investment opportunities compared to other segments
within the same firm. To mitigate concerns of measurement errors, I use a combination of
these different approaches in my tests looking at whether segments with higher q or sales
growth receive more investment allocations.
To measure the extent of cross-divisional subsidies, I follow the convention of the liter-
ature and use the sensitivity of segment investments to the segment’s own cash flow and
to cash flows from the firm’s other segments (see Lamont (1997); Shin and Stulz (1998);
Campello (2002)). The issue with this approach is that the sensitivity coefficients can be
biased if segment cash flows are correlated with unobserved investment opportunities or
with observed proxies of investment opportunities measured with error (see Whited (2001);
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Chevalier (2004)). To minimize this bias, I orthogonalize segment cash flows with respect to
observed metrics of investment opportunities, such as segment sales growth, q, and segment
industry-by-year fixed effects. Specifically, I denote SegmentCFR, or segment cash flow
residual, as the residual from the following regression:
SegmentCFi,j,t = β · SalesGrowthi,j,t + γ · qi,j,t + θt + SegmentCFRi,j,t (1)
where SegmentCFi,j,t is segment j’s cash flow scaled by firm i’s total assets in year t,
SalesGrowth is the segment’s sales growth, q is the segment’s q based on the Boguth,
Duchin, and Simutin (2018) quantile regression method, and θt denotes segment industry-by-
year fixed effects. SegmentCFR is the residual segment cash flow, representing “wind-fall”
cash flows to the segment in a given year. The residual cash flows from the firm’s other
segments can then be written as follows.
OtherSegmentCFRi,j,t =
∑
−j
SegmentCFRi,j,t (2)
SegmentCFR and OtherSegmentCFR are then used to measure how reliant segment
investments are to cash flows generated in different parts of the firm. In particular, I focus
on how different the investment-cash flow sensitivities are with respect to different sources
of cash flows. For firms with well-functioning internal capital markets unencumbered by
divisional frictions, divisions with good (bad) investment opportunities should be made less
(more) financially constrained so that they are less (more) reliant on incremental cash flows,
regardless of which divisions generate those cash flows. To test whether hedge fund activism
improves the functioning of internal capital markets in conglomerates, I estimate the changes
in these investment-cash flow sensitivities around hedge fund activism and examine whether
they become more equalized.
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2.3 Sample Overview
I merge the conglomerate and hedge fund activism data sets to construct the main sample
used in this study. The sample consists of conglomerate firms targeted by activist hedge
funds and a set of control conglomerates that are matched to targeted firms by propensity
score matching. I match each targeted conglomerate firm in year t with a non-targeted con-
glomerate firm in the same 2-digit SIC industry from the same year, that has the nearest
propensity score estimated using log firm size, Tobin’s q, profitability (ROA), all measured
at t − 1, and the change in ROA between t − 3 and t − 1 to account for the pre-targeting
performance decline in targeted firms. These are variables identified as the strongest predic-
tors of hedge fund activism, and are used by the literature for matching targeted firms with
control firms as well (see Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2018)). The activism event year for
the targeted firm, t, is assigned as the “pseudo-event” year for the matched firm. For each
conglomerate firm, I retain annual observations for five years before and after the year of the
activism or pseudo event (t− 5 to t+ 5).
Table 2 provides a statistical summary of the main sample characterizing targeted and
matched conglomerate firms. All of the reported characteristics are winsorized at the 1%
extremes. Panel A presents the mean, standard deviation, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile
values for each firm characteristic for targeted and matched conglomerate firms over the en-
tire sample period. Panel B further reports the means of the firm characteristics for targeted
and matched firms as well as their differences and t-statistics over sub-periods before and
after activism events (or pseudo-events for matched firms).
Conglomerate firms, both targeted and matched, are large and positively skewed in asset
size and market capitalization. Prior to activism events, targeted and matched firms are
similar in age (30 vs. 29 years), capital expenditures (both 6% of total assets), cash holdings
(10% vs. 11% of total assets), Tobin’s q (both 1.4), ROA growth (both close to zero over
three years), and the numbers of business segments (2.7 vs. 2.8) and industries in which
they operate (both 2.3). In particular, their capital expenditures and cash holdings remain
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similar after the events, implying that the main empirical results of this paper are not driven
by changes in firm level access to cash and overall investments following expansions imposed
by activism.
Given the large and skewed nature of conglomerate firm size and the limited capacity of
hedge funds to scale up, there remain some ex-ante differences between targeted and matched
conglomerates in the same year and industry even after propensity score matching. For ex-
ample, targeted conglomerate firms are smaller than matched firms prior to targeting with
an average asset size (market capitalization) of $2.4 billion ($1.7 billion), whereas matched
firms have average assets (market capitalization) of $10.5 billion ($6.2 billion). Targeted
firms are also more levered compared to matched firms. However, these ex-ante differences
in size and leverage persist after targeting, indicating that the main results are not driven
by differential changes in these variables. Nonetheless, I control for firm size in all of the
regression analysis.
On the other hand, several performance variables exhibit significant differential changes
between targeted and matched conglomerates around hedge fund activism, indicative of im-
provements in internal efficiency. For example, while there is no difference in Tobin’s q or
ROA growth before activism events, targeted firms have significantly higher q (1.5 vs. 1.3)
and less sluggish ROA growth afterward (zero vs. -1%). Furthermore, while targeted firms
have lower levels of profitability compared to matched firms prior to being targeted, mea-
sured by ROA (3% vs. 5%), sales growth (7% vs. 10%), and cash flows (13% vs 15% of total
assets), this gap is effectively closed after they are targeted.
Prior to activism events, targeted and matched conglomerates have similar numbers of
business segments and industries. However, targeted conglomerates have greater internal
dispersion across their divisions according to firm level Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) indices
of segment sales (0.6 vs. 0.8). After being targeted, the difference between targeted and
matched firms in their segment sales HHI is smaller (0.7 vs. 0.8), indicating that targeted
firms become less internally diversified. This is more consistent with increased efficiency on
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the intensive margin rather than with refocusing on the extensive margin. While targeted
firms have marginally fewer segments after being targeted (2.6 vs. 2.9), they still operate in
a similar number of industries as do matched firms (2.3 vs. 2.4).
Panel C of Table 2 summarizes the number of activist hedge funds in the sample, and
the concentration of their campaign activities. In total, there are 90 hedge funds targeting
the 137 conglomerate firms over our sample period, and the HHI index of fund level targeted
assets (number of targets) is 0.08 (0.03). These numbers indicate that conglomerate activism
is dispersed within our sample and not driven by a dominant hedge fund targeting many
firms.
3 Results
3.1 Hedge Fund Activism and the Diversification Discount
3.1.1 Difference-in-Differences (DID) Framework
I begin the empirical analysis by studying the impact of hedge fund activism on the diver-
sification discount of targeted conglomerate firms. The sample employed in this part of the
analysis comprises firm-year level observations covering the sample period from 1991 to 2017
and 274 unique conglomerate firms, consisting of targeted and matched conglomerate firms
only. The observations span five years prior and subsequent to the year of each activism
event (or pseudo-event for matched firms).
On this sample, I run the following difference-in-differences (DID) regression at the firm-
year level:
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati × Afteri,t + β2 · Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t (3)
where i and t denote firm and year. The dependent variable, Excess qi,t, measures the
conglomerate firm’s diversification discount as the difference between the firm’s q and its q′
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imputed from its segments, where segment q is approximated as the average q of single seg-
ment “pure-play” firms in the same 2 digit SIC industry as the segment. As described in the
previous section (see Section 2.2.1), I employ three alternative measures of q to ensure that
the results are not driven by measurement error in q or the use of single-segment firms: The
baseline Excess Tobin’s q measure is based on the conventional Tobin’s q; Goodwill Adjusted
Excess q adjusts q for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014);
BDS Excess q uses model-free estimates of segment qs without relying on standalone firms
via quantile regressions following Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018). For each measure, I
compute the discount either as q − q′ or log(q/q′).
Treati is a firm level dummy variable equal to one if the conglomerate firm is a target
of hedge fund activism, and zero otherwise. Afteri,t is a firm-year level dummy variable
which indicates whether the observation is within five years (t+1 to t+5) after an activism
event (for targeted firms) or pseudo-event year (for matched firms). Controlsi,t−1 denotes
a set of firm-year level control variables including the logarithm of market capitalization
and firm age. φi and θt are firm and year (or industry-by-year) fixed effects, respectively.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The key coefficient of interest
in Equation 3 is β1 associated with the interaction term Treati × Afteri,t, which captures
the differential change in the diversification discount of targeted firms after activism events,
as compared to matched firms. The results from this regression are reported in Table 3.
In Panel A of Table 3, I first document univariate comparisons of the average diversifica-
tion discount between targeted and matched conglomerates, both before and after activism
event years (or pseudo-event years), with their standard errors shown in parentheses. The
key result consistent across all measures is that there is little difference between targeted and
matched firms prior to event years, but there is a much larger and significantly positive differ-
ence afterward. The baseline Excess Tobin’s q measure clearly shows that both targeted and
matched conglomerates are valued at a substantial discount compared to the weighted sum
of their parts before event years (e.g., q− q′ = −0.09 and −0.07, respectively), but that this
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discount is significantly attenuated only for targeted conglomerates after event years (e.g.,
q − q′ = −0.01). In contrast, the discount continues and widens for matched conglomerates
in the post-event period (e.g., q − q′ = −0.13). On the other hand, the ex-ante discounts
are not immediately obvious in the Goodwill Adjusted Excess q or BDS Excess q measures,
except for log(q/q′) in the case of Goodwill Adjusted Excess q, in line with Custo´dio (2014)
and Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018) who propose that there is no diversification dis-
count once measurement errors are accounted for. For example, the BDS Excess q measure
suggests a diversification premium. However, even for these measures, excess q is higher in
the post-activism period compared to the pre-event period for targeted conglomerates, while
excess q generally declines for matched conglomerates. Even if one takes an agnostic view
regarding which measure to focus on, it is clear that there is substantial value that hedge
funds are able to add to the conglomerates they target, or losses they are able to help avoid.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the main regression results from Equation 3. There are
twelve specifications in total, alternating between different correction schemes for q (e.g.,
baseline Excess Tobin’s q, Goodwill Adjusted Excess q, or BDS Excess q), different ways of
expressing excess q (e.g., q−q′ or log(q/q′)), and different fixed effects (e.g., year or industry-
by-year fixed effects). For every one of these specifications, the diff-in-diff coefficients on the
Treat×After interaction term is highly positive and significant, ranging from a differential
change in excess q as small as 0.12 or 7% to as large as 0.18 or 11%. Eight out of the twelve
specifications yield a coefficient on the interaction term that is significant at the 1% level
and otherwise significant at 5%. These results strongly suggest that hedge fund activism
increases the value of targeted conglomerates relative to their single-segment benchmark,
alleviating the diversification discount.
3.1.2 Excess q Dynamics around Hedge Fund Activism
To confirm that differences in pre-event trends between targeted and matched firms do not
confound the DID regressions, I analyze the year-by-year dynamics of the diversification
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discount for targeted and matched firms separately by estimating regressions of excess q on
yearly dummies. I report the results in Table 4, and also plot the coefficients in Figure 1.
Specifically, I run the following regression.
Excess qi,t =
+3∑
k=−3
βk · d[t+ k]i,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t (4)
As in the previous analysis, I use three different versions of the diversification discount
(i.e., Excess Tobin’s q, Goodwill Adjusted Excess q, and BDS Excess q) as the dependent
variable. d[t+ k]i,t denote dummy variables indicating whether the firm-year observation is
k years from the activism event (or pseudo-event) year t. The coefficients, β−3, ..., β3, are
the slopes on the yearly dummies, together describing the dynamics of excess q from three
years prior to the activism event (or pseudo-event) year through three years afterward. As
in Equation 3, I include firm size and age as control variables, and also control for firm and
industry-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
This regression is run on subsamples consisting of either targeted or matched firms, and the
results for both samples are presented side-by-side in Table 4 and Figure 1.
Based on all of the different measures of the diversification discount, Table 4 and Figure 1
show that excess q deteriorates in the years leading up to the activism event year from t− 3
to t − 1 for both targeted and matched conglomerates. In the first panel of Figure 1, for
example, Excess Tobin’s q for targeted and matched conglomerates gradually trend downward
in parallel. Subsequent to the activism year from t + 1 to t + 3, however, there is a clear
and abrupt divergence where excess q of targeted firms jump upward over the first year after
being targeted and persist at the newly high level in subsequent years. In sharp contrast,
excess q of matched conglomerates continue down the deteriorating trend. Similar pre and
post-event trends are found for alternative measures of excess q as well. Overall, the parallel
pre-event trends mitigate concerns of unobserved differences other than targeting by activist
hedge funds that may also be driving the large subsequent divergence in excess q between
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targeted and matched conglomerates.
Taken together, these results highlight the effect of hedge fund activism in attenuating
the diversification discount in targeted conglomerates. In subsequent analysis, I explore
potential channels that help explain this key result.
3.2 Segment Investment Efficiency around Hedge Fund Activism
3.2.1 Do Targeted Firms Invest More in Segments with Good Opportunities?
Having established the effect of hedge fund activism on alleviating the diversification dis-
count, next I conduct firm-segment-year level analysis to examine whether hedge fund ac-
tivism differentially improves the efficiency of investment allocations across divisions within
targeted firms as compared to those of matched firms.
To do so, I start by testing whether targeted conglomerates invest more in segments
with good investment opportunities rather than in less promising divisions, compared to
matched conglomerates. Specifically, I run firm-segment-year level regressions of segment
investments, further interacting the key explanatory variables from Equation 3 with indica-
tors for whether the segment’s investment opportunity ranks high or low within the firm.
Estimating the following triple difference regression probes the differential effects of hedge
fund activism across segments within targeted and matched firms.
SegInvi,j,t = α · Treati × Afteri,t + β · Treati × Afteri,t ×HighInvOppi,j,t−1
+ δ · Treati × InvOppi,j,t−1 + κ · Afteri,t × InvOppi,j,t−1 + λ · Afteri,t + τ · InvOppi,j,t−1
+ γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,j,t
(5)
The subscript j denotes the jth business segment of firm i. SegInvi,j,t is segment j’s
capital expenditure in year t, scaled by firm i’s total assets in year t− 1 to gauge how much
the firm allocates to segment j relative to its other segments. HighInvOppi,j,t−1 is a dummy
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variable equal to one if segment j’s investment opportunity is above firm i’s average as of
year t − 1, and zero otherwise. I also estimate Equation 5 replacing this dummy variable
with LowInvOppi,j,t−1, HighestInvOppi,j,t−1, or LowestInvOppi,j,t−1, which are indicators
for whether the segment has below average, the best, or worst investment opportunity within
the firm. Segment j’s investment opportunity as of year t − 1, denoted by InvOppi,j,t−1, is
defined in two alternative ways: (i) Segment’s q as the average q of single-segment standalone
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry as the segment, adjusted for the accounting of goodwill
in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), or (ii) the segment’s sales growth rate. As in
Equation 3, Treati indicates whether firm i is a targeted firm, and Afteri,t indicates whether
firm i’s observation in year t is in the years subsequent to the activism event year (or pseudo-
event year for matched firms). Firm market capitalization and age are included as control
variables. Firm and industry-by-year fixed effects are included as well. The standard errors
are adjusted for clustering at the firm-segment level.
The coefficient of interest in Equation 5 is β, which estimates the effect of hedge fund
activism on segment investment separately for segments that have good or poor investment
opportunities, relative to other segments of the firm as indicated by α. The other coefficients,
δ, κ, and τ in particular, account for permanent differences in allocative efficiency between
targeted and matched firms or common trends thereof. The results are reported in Table 5.
Columns 1-4 and 5-8 of Table 5 present results based on segment q and sales growth
as proxies for division level investment opportunities, respectively. The first specification
shows that targeted conglomerates increase investments in segments with strictly higher than
average q by 0.73% more of firm level total assets as compared to matched conglomerates,
while all other segments do not increase investments. In fact, the next regression shows that
segments whose qs are strictly below the firm average invest 0.63% less of the firm’s assets
compared to all other segments that invest on average 0.42% more out of total assets when the
conglomerate is targeted, implying that segments with strictly poor investment opportunities
reduce investments. A similar contrast is observed when I compare the highest and lowest
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q segments within the firm. Segments with the highest q invest 0.59% more of the firm’s
total assets, whereas those with the lowest q reduce investments by 0.51% of total assets.
The results hold similarly using segment sales growth as an alternative proxy for segment
investment opportunities, though it is less clear that poor opportunity segments strictly
reduce investments. However, the relative contrast between the changes in investments by
divisions with good and bad opportunities are well documented in the results, highlighting
improvements in within-conglomerate investment efficiency.
3.2.2 Do Segments of Targeted Firms become Less Constrained?
To examine whether this increased efficiency arises from a more effective allocation of firm
level capital across divisions, I further investigate whether divisions of targeted firms be-
come more or less financially constrained. If divisions with better investment opportunities
receive more of the firm’s capital to invest, and divisions with worse opportunities invest less,
one would expect that the targeted conglomerate’s divisions would become less constrained
overall. To test this hypothesis, I analyze the effects of hedge fund activism on self and
cross-division cash flow subsidies of investments by estimating the following firm-segment-
year level regression for targeted and matched firms separately (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988, 2000); Campello (2002)).
SegInvi,j,t = α1 · SegmentCFRi,j,t + α2 ·OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t
+ β1 · Afteri,t × SegmentCFRi,j,t + β2 · Afteri,t ×OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t
+ λ · Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi,j + θt + ǫi,j,t
(6)
SegmentCFRi,j,t denotes the “residual” cash flow of segment j of firm i, where I orthog-
onalize segment cash flows with respect to proxies for investment opportunities using the
algorithm detailed in Section 2.2.2. OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t is the residual cash flows from
all other segments of firm i excluding segment j. I then run regressions of segment invest-
ment, defined above as SegInvi,j,t, on these residual cash flows and also their interaction
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terms with the Afteri,t dummy. Since the segment investment and cash flow variables are
all scaled by firm total assets, the test provides a dollar-to-dollar comparison of the effects
of cash flows that accrue in different parts of the firm. Firm control variables are included
as before, and I further control for firm-segment and industry-by-year fixed effects. The
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm-segment level.
While the key coefficients, β1 and β2, capture whether investment-cash flow subsidies
change after activism events or pseudo-events, the α coefficients convey important informa-
tion as well. Prior to events, a fully integrated internal capital market would imply that
α1 and α2 are equal, as cash flows would be allocated to divisions in need regardless of the
source of cash flows. If divisions are not financially constrained, however, the magnitudes
of these coefficients would be small. The role of hedge fund activism in improving internal
capital markets would then imply that α1 and α2 are unequal, and that β1 and β2 are such
that α1 + β1 and α2 + β2 are equal but overall smaller in magnitude, as internal capital
markets become more integrated and divisions less constrained as a result.
The results reported in Panel A of Table 6 confirm this hypothesis. Ex-ante, I find that
conglomerate segments adjust investments much more sensitively to their own residual cash
flows than to those accruing in other segments of the same firm, consistent with earlier find-
ings in the literature that internal capital markets are segmented (see Shin and Stulz (1998)).
For both targeted and matched conglomerates, as shown in Columns 1-3, the coefficients on
SegmentCFRi,j,t are much larger and more significant than those on OtherSegmentCFRi,j,t
(i.e., α1 ranging from 8.32 to 9.16 significant at 1% vs. α2 ranging from 0.99 to 2.87 signifi-
cant at 5% or less). F -tests comparing the two coefficients within each sample confirm this
discrepancy, as seen from p-values close to zero.
The key results of Panel A are shown in Columns 4 and 5, namely that targeted conglom-
erates reduce this discrepancy after activism events by lowering segments’ reliance on their
own cash flows, whereas matched conglomerates make no such changes. For targets, the
coefficient on SegmentCFRi,j,t decreases from 10.33 by 6.86. As a result, the sensitivity of a
22
segment’s investment to its own cash flow (i.e., 10.33−6.86) is made more equal to its invest-
ment sensitivity to other segments’ cash flows (i.e., 3.66−3.22). F -tests confirm that α1+β1
and α2 + β2 are not significantly different for targeted conglomerates (i.e., p-value of 0.27
in Column 4), but remain different for matched conglomerates (i.e., p-value of 0.10 in Col-
umn 5). The difference between targeted and matched conglomerate responses to activism
is also evident from F -tests comparing coefficients across the two samples. While segments’
investment sensitivities to their own cash flows are similar between targeted and matched
firms prior to targeting (i.e., p-value for difference in coefficient on SegmentCFRi,j,t between
Columns 2 and 3 of 0.40), they diverge afterward where matched firm segments remain more
sensitive than targeted firm segments (i.e., p-value for difference in sum of coefficients on
SegmentCFRi,j,t and Afteri,t × SegmentCFRi,j,t between Columns 4 and 5 of 0.13). In
short, Panel A of Table 6 shows that hedge fund activism induces targeted conglomerate
segments to become less reliant on their own cash flows compared to segments of matched
conglomerates, indicative of the alleviation of division level financial constraints.
A natural question then is whether divisions with good and bad investment opportunities
are affected differentially in how their financial constraints are alleviated. To investigate this
issue, I augment Equation 6 by further interacting each explanatory variable with a dummy
variable, HighInvOppi,j,t−1, which equals one if the segment’s investment opportunity is
above the firm average and zero otherwise. I employ three measures of segment investment
opportunities: (i) Tobin’s q, (ii) q adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets
following Custo´dio (2014), and (iii) segment sales growth, where in the first two methods
segment q is the average q of single segment firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry as the
segment.
Panel B of Table 6 shows the results from estimating this augmented regression for tar-
geted and matched conglomerate samples separately. Broadly, the results are consistent with
those shown in Panel A, in that the sensitivity of segment investment to the segment’s own
cash flow declines after activism events for targeted firms, but not for matched firms. While
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the coefficient on the SegmentCFRi,j,t term is positive and significant for both targeted and
matched firms, the Afteri,t × SegmentCFRi,j,t term is significantly negative and large in
magnitude only for targeted firms. It also holds that segments’ investment sensitivities to
their own cash flows and to other segments’ cash flows are equalized after event years for
targeted firms, but not for matched firms.
Between segments with high and low investment opportunities, there is no statistically
significant difference in the effect of hedge fund activism on segment investment-cash flow sen-
sitivities. The coefficients associated with the interaction terms Afteri,t×SegmentCFRi,j,t×
HighInvOppi,j,t−1 and Afteri,t ×OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t ×HighInvOppi,j,t−1 are not sig-
nificant. One potential explanation is a lack of statistical power given that the regression
model becomes imposing. However, it is not surprising that hedge fund activism should
help targeted conglomerate firms to alleviate financial constraints for all of their divisions:
For divisions with good opportunities through internal capital allocations that increase their
investments while reducing their reliance on their own cash flows; and for divisions without
such opportunities by reducing their investments relative to the good divisions.
It is interesting to note that prior to event years, low opportunity segments of matched
firms are relatively less constrained than segments with high opportunities, whereas high
and low opportunity segments of targeted firms are both equally and highly constrained
(see coefficients on the terms SegmentCFRi,j,t and SegmentCFRi,j,t × HighInvOppi,j,t−1
in Columns 1-4). This indicates that activist hedge funds target firms with more severe
overinvestment and funding problems. I revisit the question of whether ex-ante firm level
financial constraints matter for the effectiveness of hedge fund activism in Section 3.3.
3.2.3 Segment Profitability Dispersion around Hedge Fund Activism
To corroborate the findings above, I inspect another prediction that arises naturally from the
hypothesis that hedge fund activism leads to optimized internal capital markets, namely that
marginal returns on capital should be more equalized across divisions within conglomerates
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after they are targeted by activists.
I examine this idea in Figure 2. I plot kernel distributions of segment profitability (i.e.,
ROA) as a proxy for division level marginal returns, before (dotted line) and after (solid
line) hedge fund activism events (or pseudo-events) for targeted (left) and matched (right)
conglomerates. Segment ROA is demeaned within the firm-year level. The kurtosis coeffi-
cients and standard deviations of the distributions are reported in the legends.
Figure 2 illustrates that the dispersion of segment profitability declines for targeted con-
glomerates after activism events. The standard deviation is reduced from 0.12 to 0.09, while
the kurtosis increases from 4.94 to 5.54, indicating a more centered distribution. On the
other hand, there is no change in the distribution of segment profitability for matched con-
glomerates after pseudo-events.
Overall, the results presented above are strongly consistent with targeted conglomerates
improving the efficiency of internal capital allocations across their divisions in response to
pressure by activist hedge funds.
3.3 Does Hedge Fund Activism Matter More for Financially Con-
strained Firms?
The main results thus far support the hypothesis that hedge fund activism helps alleviate
the diversification discount of targeted conglomerate firms, and that this is achieved through
increased efficiency in how investment resources are allocated across divisions within the
firm. Several corollaries follow from this hypothesis, and further empirical evidence on these
corollaries can help bolster the interpretations of the main findings.
The first is that the effect of hedge fund activism should be more pronounced among
financially constrained firms than among unconstrained firms, as the utilization of internal
funds would create more value when access to external financing is limited (see Billett and
Mauer (2003); Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004); Denis and Sibilkov (2010); Duchin,
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010); Gamba and Triantis (2008); Matvos and Seru (2014); Matvos,
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Seru, and Silva (2018)). To test this hypothesis, I rerun regressions of Equations 3 (diversi-
fication discount test) and 5 (segment investment efficiency test) on subsamples comprising
financially constrained or unconstrained firms.
To sort firms into subsamples, I use three different metrics of financial constraints. The
first metric employs an imputed and indirect measure, the Kaplan-Zingales index (see Ka-
plan and Zingales (1997); Lamont, Polk, and Saa´-Requejo (2001)), which relies on predicting
constraints out of sample using accounting variables based on reduced-form relations. Firms
are classified as constrained if their computed KZ index values lie above the yearly median,
and unconstrained otherwise. The second and third metrics provide more direct measures of
constraints. One measure is the availability of credit ratings on the firm’s debt (see Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004)). If the firm has no available rating but has positive debt,
it is considered to have limited access to additional borrowing and thus classified as con-
strained. However, if the firm has a valid rating or does not have any debt, it is categorized
as unconstrained. The last metric is a text-based measure developed by Hoberg and Mak-
simovic (2015), who analyze texts of management discussions on financing needs and firm
liquidity disclosed in 10-K statements to construct an index of financial constraints. Firms
are identified as constrained if their index values lie above the annual median, and uncon-
strained otherwise.
Once firms are split into financially constrained and unconstrained subsamples based on
one of the algorithms described above, I estimate Equations 3 and 5 for each sample and
report the results side-by-side in Panel A and B of Table 7, respectively. Panel A shows the
impact of hedge fund activism on the diversification discount for the constrained and un-
constrained subsamples. To conserve space, I report results based on two excess q measures
- Goodwill Adjusted Excess q and BDS Excess q. For both measures of the diversification
discount, and for all three measures of financial constraints, I find that the attenuating effect
of hedge fund activism is stronger among financially constrained firms compared to uncon-
strained firms. For example, the coefficient on the interaction term, Treati×Afteri,t, is 0.18
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(5% significance) and 0.30 (10% significance) for financially constrained firms based on the
credit rating and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) measures, respectively, when the dependent
variable is Goodwill Adjusted Excess q. For unconstrained firms, these coefficients are both
statistically insignificant with estimates of 0.02 and 0.06, respectively. The p-values from
testing the differences of these coefficients between constrained and unconstrained groups
yield marginal results (e.g., significant at 5% only for the KZ index). However, if a sub-
optimal internal capital market results partially from agency problems rather than ample
acess to external financing, these differences need not be statistically significant. I revisit
this channel in Section 3.4.
Panel B of Table 7 documents the effect of hedge fund activism on segment investment effi-
ciency, based on lagged segment sales growth as a proxy for division level investment opportu-
nities. For all three measures of financial constraints, the improvement in allocative efficiency
following hedge fund activism is stronger among financially constrained firms, corroborating
the interpretations for the alleviation of the diversification discount. This is seen by examin-
ing the coefficient on the triple interaction term, Treati×Afteri,t×HighSalesGrowthi,j,t−1,
or alternitavely Treati × Afteri,t ×HighestSalesGrowthi,j,t−1. After constrained firms are
targeted by hedge funds, they significantly increase investments only in their high (highest)
sales growth segments by as little as 0.50% to as much as 0.74% (0.59%) of their firm level
total assets, depending on the constraint measure. In contrast, unconstrained firms do not
significantly increase investments differentially in segments with good opportunities. How-
ever, the coefficient on the triple interaction term is generally positive for the unconstrained
sample as well, and the differences between the constrained and unconstrained samples are
not always statistically significant, again suggesting an alternative channel related to agency
costs that may also affect internal capital markets.
The results are broadly consistent with the intuition that an activist hedge fund aiming
to improve the excess value of a targeted conglomerate would push to optimize its internal
capital market especially if the target is financially constrained, since the value of an internal
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capital market is likely to be greater when the firm has limited access to external financ-
ing. A larger attenuation in the diversification discount and more investment allocations to
segments with high sales growth among financially constrained targets support this inter-
pretation. In the following section, I examine an alternative agency-based channel that can
explain the effect of hedge fund activism on the internal efficiency of conglomerates.
3.4 CEO Turnover, Internal Connections, and the Effect of Hedge
Fund Activism
Another corollary from the main hypothesis is that the impact of hedge fund activism on
the efficiency of conglomerates should be stronger if there is a CEO turnover subsequent
to the activism event that severs ties between powerful divisional managers and the CEO.
If the diversification discount of targeted conglomerates stem from internal power struggles
and divisional rent seeking (see Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000); Scharfstein and Stein
(2000); Xuan (2009); Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010); Duchin and Sosyura (2013)), an activism
event that brings in a new CEO from outside of the company, for example, should have a
larger impact on improving internal efficiency than otherwise. This is a plausible channel
for my main results given previous evidence on the effect of hedge fund activism on CEO
turnover (see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008)). To test this channel, I run the
following firm-year level regression as an extension of Equation 3.
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati × Afteri,t + β2 · Treati × Afteri,t × Turnoveri
+ λ · Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
(7)
Turnoveri is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was targeted and subsequently
experienced a CEO turnover within the next five years. Using CEO appointment data from
ExecuComp, I denote a turnover where an incumbent CEO was replaced by a firm outsider
(insider) - defined as a person who had joined the firm less (more) than two years ago fol-
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lowing Parrino (1997) - as TurnoverOuti (TurnoverIni).
9 All other variables and controls
are as in Equation 3. The coefficient, β2, estimates the differential impact of hedge fund
activism on the diversification discount for targeted firms that experience a subsequent CEO
turnover, above and beyond its impact on non-turnover targets as estimated by β1. The
results are reported in Table 8. The estimates for the coefficient, β1, on the interaction term,
Treati×Afteri,t, reconfirm the main result of the paper reported in Section 3.1, namely that
hedge fund activism attenuates the diversification discount of targeted conglomerates. The
estimates are highly significant and positive across all specifications, and similar in magni-
tude with those reported in Table 3.
The central result in Table 8 is the coefficient, β2, on the triple interaction term, Treati×
Afteri,t×TurnoverOuti, which is positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the
β2 estimates are at least as large as the β1 estimates across most specifications, highlighting a
substantial incremental impact of outside CEO turnovers subsequent to being targeted. For
example, the result based on Excess Tobin’s q in Column 1 suggests the excess q growth dif-
ferential for targets relative to controls is 13% for targeted conglomerates without an outside
CEO turnover, but 27% for those whose CEOs are subsequently replaced by an outsider.
In sharp contrast, the coefficient on the triple interaction term, Treati × Afteri,t ×
TurnoverIni, is negligible in magnitude, negative in sign, and statistically insignificant, re-
gardless of the excess q measure employed. This implies that when an incumbent CEO is
replaced by an insider of the firm, there is no incremental efficiency improvement beyond what
would occur without an inside turnover. When both terms, Treati×Afteri,t×TurnoverOuti
and Treati × Afteri,t × TurnoverIni, are included together in the same regression, each of
their coefficients remain intact with only the outside CEO turnover effect standing out as a
substantial incremental impact relative to the benchmark effect of hedge fund activism with
no subsequent CEO turnover of any kind.
These results are consistent with the role of hedge fund activism in alleviating ex-ante
9Constraining the sample to firms covered by the ExecuComp universe truncates the sample size by half.
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agency frictions where divisional managers and incumbent CEOs have social ties that distort
the efficient allocation of divisional investment subsidies. The interpretation is that when
the incumbent CEO is replaced by someone from outside of the firm after being targeted
by an activist hedge fund, these ties are severed and the allocative inefficiencies are effec-
tively removed. On the other hand, when the CEO is replaced by an insider, it is more
likely that one social network of intra-firm ties between divisional managers and the CEO is
simply replaced with another preexisting social network, thus having a weaker effect on the
diversification discount.
3.5 Payout Policy and the Effect of Hedge Fund Activism
Previous studies show that one of the common outcomes of hedge fund activism is an in-
crease in payout (see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); Klein and Zur (2009)), which
potentially serves as a disciplinary mechanism by reducing agency costs of free cash flows
available to managers (see DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000)). Here, I test whether target firms
whose payout is increased after an activism event are more likely to show reduced diversi-
fication discounts, consistent with such a disciplining change enhancing internal allocative
efficiency. I run the following regression.
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati × Afteri,t + β2 · Treati × Afteri,t × IncrPayouti
+ λ · Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
(8)
IncrPayouti is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was targeted and subse-
quently increased either its overall payout (i.e., inclusive of repurchases), in which case I
denote the dummy as IncrPayouti, or its dividends, where I denote it as IncrDivi. Payout
ratios are computed as a fraction of lagged assets, and the firm is identified as increasing its
payout if its average payout ratio is higher during the post-activism period (Afteri,t = 1)
than during the pre-activism period (Afteri,t = 0). The regression is otherwise analogous
to Equation 7. The coefficient, β2, captures the differential effect of hedge fund activism on
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the diversification discount of targeted firms who increase their payouts ex-post, relative to
its effect on targets who do not as indicated by β1. Table 9 reports the results.
Across all measures of excess q, Table 9 shows that conglomerates who increase payout
after being targeted experience a greater attenuation in their diversification discount. In
every specification, the coefficient on the interaction term, Treati × Afteri,t, is positive,
and in all but one specification also statistically significant, indicating that the main re-
sult holds even for firms that do not payout more. However, the coefficient estimates on
the triple interaction term, Treati ×Afteri,t × IncrPayouti, highlight an important role of
activism-induced changes in payout policy in disciplining managerial decisions on divisional
investment allocations. The β2 coefficient is not only always positive and mostly significant
(e.g., point estimate of 0.19 significant at 5% in Column 5), but also larger in magnitude
than β1 (e.g., point estimate of 0.15 significant at 10% in Column 5), indicating that the
impact of hedge fund activism is more than twice as large when the targeted conglomerate
increases its payout subsequent to the activism event.
Consistent with the flexibility in buyback programs and the relatively stronger commit-
ment embedded in changes in dividend payments, the effects are stronger for increases in
dividends than for those in overall payout. The β2 estimates are always larger in mag-
nitude and in most cases more statistically significant when they are estimated using a
dummy for dividend increases (IncrDivi) rather than an indicator for overall payout in-
creases (IncrPayouti). The magnitude of the difference in the β2 estimate can be as large
as 30%. For example, in Column 5 the coefficient on the triple interaction term is 0.19 (5%
significance), compared to 0.25 in Column 6 (5% significance). These estimates indicate that
increases in dividend commitments reduce the future expected free cash flows available to
managers, mitigating agency costs more effectively than temporary increases in repurchases.
Overall, the evidence from Table 9 further supports an agency cost mitigation channel in
which hedge fund activism brings changes to conglomerates that better align the incentives
of managers to allocate capital more efficiently.
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3.6 Increasing Internal Efficiency vs. Refocusing Firm Boundary
An alternative interpretation of our results may be that it is not that internal efficiency
improvements are driving the attenuation of the diversification discount, but that firms
are simply forced to shed assets and refocus their operations (see Bethel, Liebeskind, and
Opler (1998)). If focused firms have higher valuations as documented by the literature (see
Comment and Jarrell (1995)), activism-induced refocusing could result in a diminished di-
versification discount.
This is unlikely a concern in my study, because the main sample comprises only con-
glomerate firm-year observations. In other words, none of the analysis includes cases where
a conglomerate subsequently becomes focused. However, one may still ask whether improv-
ing efficiency within the intensive margin of the firm is a suboptimal choice compared to
refocusing the firm along the extensive margin. To test this possibility, I extend the sample
to include yearly observations for the main sample of conglomerate firms when they are no
longer diversified. This increases the sample size from 1,408 firm-year observations to 1,768,
implying that refocusing occurs in roughly one third of targeted conglomerates. On this
sample, I run regressions analogous to Equations 7 and 8, written as follows:
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati × Afteri,t + β2 · Treati × Afteri,t ×Refocusi
+ λ · Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
(9)
where Refocusi is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a target that reduces the
average number of its business segments (RefocusSegi) or segment industries at the 2 digit
SIC level (RefocusSICi) after an activism event compared to before. The coefficient, β2,
indicates the differential impact of hedge fund activism on the excess q of targeted firms who
refocus their operations after the activism event, relative to its effect on targets who remain
diversified as indicated by β1. I present the results in Table 10.
The key takeaway from Table 10 is that refocusing the boundary of the firm is no more
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valuable an activism outcome than increasing the internal allocative efficiency within the
boundary of the firm. While the coefficient on the interaction term, Treati × Afteri,t, is
always positive and highly significant as in the earlier main result, the coefficient on the
triple interaction term, Treati×Afteri,t×Refocusi, is never positive or significant. In fact,
the sign on the estimate for β2 is always negative, indicating that the positive effect of hedge
fund activism on excess q is marginally stronger for conglomerates that do not reduce the
number of their segments, neither at the segment level nor segment industry level. The result
suggests a unique role of hedge fund activism in the functioning of target internal capital
markets.
3.7 Endogeneity of Hedge Fund Activism
Activist hedge funds choose targets selectively, meaning that treatment of hedge fund ac-
tivism is not random. This raises potential endogeneity concerns on the interpretations of
the changes in targeted conglomerates around activism events. One argument can be that
hedge funds target firms with relatively severe inefficiencies, so that their interventions will
have a larger impact on firm value. However, it is precisely this type of selection that is of
interest for this study, as it implies there are underlying problems in the way diversified firms
are managed that activist hedge funds are able to correct. An alternative argument is that
the observed improvements in firm value and allocative efficiency may not be attributable to
the real effects of hedge fund activism, but merely to their skill in picking firms that would
exhibit such changes even in the absence of active interventions. For example, if discounted
conglomerates simply have higher future returns, excess q would be mean-reverting (see La-
mont and Polk (2001)). Then, hedge funds that are skilled at timing their investments would
be able to invest in discounted conglomerates and earn abnormal returns in the upward slop-
ing segment of the mean reversion process, even without any real activist effort.
If the latter were the case, targeted and matched conglomerates would have different
trends prior to the event date, as hedge funds would target firms with increasingly less
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downward trending excess qs, while matched firms would have upward trending but gradu-
ally plateauing excess qs. It would also be the case that the post-event differences between
targets and matched firms are transitory. From Table 4 and Figure 1, it is clear that neither
is true. Rather, targeted and matched conglomerates show similar pre-event trends in their
diversification discounts, and persistent divergences afterward. However, one may still be
concerned that targeted and matched firms may have different degrees of mean reversion,
where conglomerates with more prominent mean reversion are selected by hedge funds.
To further address this issue, I also perform a direct test for mean reversion of excess q
in the sample of conglomerate firms by running an OLS regression of the percentage growth
rate of excess q from t − 1 to t on the level of excess q in t − 1, controlling for firm fixed
effects to capture mean reversion within firms. I also allow for targeted conglomerates to
have a different slope by interacting lagged excess q with a treatment indicator (Treati)
to test whether they exhibit a higher degree of mean reversion compared to matched con-
glomerates. If hedge funds were simply picking stocks that are more likely to mean-revert,
one would expect a negative and significant coefficient on the level of excess q for targeted
conglomerates. This regression can be written as follows.
%∆Excess qi,t = β1 · Excess qi,t−1 + β2 · Excess qi,t−1 × Treati + φi + ǫi,t (10)
The results from this regression are shown in Table 11. For all measures of the diversifica-
tion discount, the coefficient on the lagged level of excess q is never negative and significant.
More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term, Excess qi,t−1 × Treati, is never
significantly negative either. If anything, β2 is positive and large in magnitude, indicating
that excess q growth is in fact higher when lagged excess q is high for targeted conglomerates,
ruling out explanations based on mean reversion of the diversification discount.
The existing literature also provides findings that work against the notion that the ob-
served effects of hedge fund activism cannot be attributed to activism per-se. For example,
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hedge fund activism has been associated with changes in target companies that are unlikely
to take place in the absence of pressure from activists, such as sharp increases in CEO and
board turnover rates (see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008)). Activism campaigns
also entail significant costs for the activist investor, implying that the expected returns from
activism are commensurately high. For instance, campaigns that end in proxy fights are esti-
mated to cost on average $11 million (see Gantchev (2013)). Furthermore, numerous studies
find that the announcement returns on 13D filings disclosing activist stakes are higher than
those on 13G filings for passive stakes (see Clifford (2008); Klein and Zur (2009)).
In short, the evidence presented here and in other studies to date suggest it is unlikely
that the endogeneity of hedge fund activism confounds the interpretations of my findings.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I present novel evidence of hedge fund activism in an important segment of
the economy comprised of large and diversified conglomerate firms. By studying the impact
of hedge fund activism on the diversification discount and divisional investment efficiency of
conglomerates, I contribute to the debate in finance on the efficiency of conglomerate firms.
The results also shed new light on the broad role of shareholder activism in the economy.
I begin by showing empirical evidence in a difference-in-differences setting that hedge
fund activism leads to a significant attenuation in the diversification discount of targeted
conglomerate firms, a result that is robust to numerous methods of measuring the diversifi-
cation discount introduced in the literature. The path of the diversification discount among
targeted and matched firms suggest that their trends are parallel prior to the activism event,
partially alleviating concerns regarding confounding effects. Moreover, matched conglomer-
ates continue on a path of value deterioration, implying activist hedge funds’ skill in unlocking
value in diversified firms that would otherwise be forgone.
Consistent with optimization of internal capital markets, I find that targeted conglom-
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erates allocate more investments than before to business segments with good investment
opportunities and alleviate division level financial constraints. These results are stronger
for firms that are financially constrained and thus face a higher marginal value of internal
capital. Furthermore, the effect of hedge fund activism on the diversification discount is
stronger when targeted firms thereafter replace their incumbent CEOs with firm outsiders,
severing social ties between divisional managers and the incumbent CEO that may have
hindered efficient internal allocation prior to being targeted. The effect is also stronger
when the targeted firm increases its payout ratio ex-post, consistent with an agency-based
mechanism where activists discipline the management by stripping them of free cash flow,
forcing them to allocate investments across divisions more efficiently. While previous studies
provide evidence of shareholder activism reshaping firm boundaries through asset sales and
refocusing, this paper shows that hedge fund activism brings improvements to the internal
allocation efficiency of target conglomerates, which is at least as important to alleviating the
diversification discount as refocusing the firm.
Finally, I discuss the implications of endogenous targeting for these results. Hedge funds
choose targets, for example, those that are performing poorly, with the aim of improving
their operations through active interventions. Such selection is not a confounding factor for
this study, but rather highlights the large ex-ante inefficiencies that plague target conglom-
erates. Another alternative explanation is that hedge funds simply exploit mean reversion in
the diversification discount and the internal efficiency of conglomerates, rather than bringing
real effects to the table themselves. I find no evidence of mean reversion among my sample
of conglomerates, particularly for targeted firms, suggesting that the effects of hedge fund
activism are unlikely the results of luck or passive stock picking.
Overall, the evidence from this study are consistent with large ex-ante inefficiencies within
conglomerates, and a positive role played by activist hedge funds in removing intra-firm fric-
tions underlying such inefficiencies.
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Figure 1. Excess q Dynamics around Hedge Fund Activism
These figures plot the dynamics of the diversification discount of conglomerate firms, measured as the
difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q and the imputed q′ from its individual business segments, or Excess
q, in the years around hedge fund activism events (or pseudo-events for matched control firms). Imputed
q′ is the asset-weighted average of segment qs, where each segment’s q is the average q of single-segment
standalone firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry as the segment. Excess q is then expressed either as q− q′
or log(q/q′). The coefficients and their standard error bands are estimated and presented from the following
specification:
Excess qi,t =
+3∑
k=−3
βk · d[t+ k]i,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
where d[t+k] is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm observation is k years from the hedge fund activism
event year (or pseudo-event year for matched control firms), and zero otherwise. The βk coefficients, which
capture the trends in the diversification discount around activism events (or pseudo events), are plotted for
targeted firms and matched control firms separately. In Panel A, I use Tobin’s q to compute the dependent
variable, Excess Tobin’s q. In Panel B, q is adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following
Custo´dio (2014), to compute the dependent variable, Goodwill Adjusted Excess q. In Panel C, I use model-
free estimates of segment qs without relying on standalone firms via quantile regressions following Boguth,
Duchin, and Simutin (2018), to compute the dependent variable, BDS Excess q. Firm level control variables
include the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization and firm age. Firm fixed effects and
industry-by-year fixed effects are included as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm
level.
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Figure 1. Excess q Dynamics around Hedge Fund Activism (continued)
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Figure 2. Segment Profitability Dispersion around Hedge Fund Activism
These figures plot kernel distributions of segment profitability, or ROA, before (dotted line) and after (solid
line) hedge fund activism events (or pseudo-events for matched control firms), for targeted (left) and matched
control (right) conglomerate firms. Segment ROA is demeaned within the firm-year level. The kurtosis
coefficients and standard deviations of the distributions are reported in the legends.
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Table 1. Conglomerate Hedge Fund Activism by Year and Industry
This table summarizes the number of conglomerate firms targeted by hedge fund activism (# of Target
Firms), the number of activism campaigns (# of Campaigns), the average of targeted firm assets (Avg Assets
Targeted), total assets of all targeted conglomerate firms (Total Assets Targeted), the average number of
segments in targeted conglomerate firms (Avg # of Segments), and total number of segments in all targeted
conglomerate firms (Total # of Segments), within each year (Panel A) and each of the Fama-French 12
industries (Panel B).
Panel A. Conglomerate Hedge Fund Activism by Year
Year # of # of Avg Assets Total Assets Avg # of Total # of
Target Firms Campaigns Targeted ($bn) Targeted ($bn) Segments Segments
1994 2 2 0.13 0.27 2.00 4.00
1995 6 6 5.74 34.43 2.17 13.00
1996 7 7 4.47 31.30 2.57 18.00
1997 6 6 0.49 2.92 2.50 15.00
1998 6 6 0.33 1.96 2.17 13.00
1999 7 7 0.83 5.78 3.43 24.00
2000 4 4 0.41 1.64 3.00 12.00
2001 2 2 1.00 2.00 2.50 5.00
2002 5 5 0.22 1.09 2.60 13.00
2003 4 4 0.86 3.44 3.00 12.00
2004 8 9 0.20 1.82 2.22 17.78
2005 7 8 0.91 7.30 2.75 19.25
2006 10 11 3.87 42.57 3.00 30.00
2007 13 14 0.99 13.80 2.64 34.36
2008 8 8 1.17 9.34 3.00 24.00
2009 2 2 2.57 5.15 2.50 5.00
2010 8 10 4.01 40.11 2.80 22.40
2011 4 5 0.87 4.37 2.60 10.40
2012 7 10 3.14 31.38 2.30 16.10
2013 12 12 5.84 70.04 2.75 33.00
2014 9 10 3.53 35.29 2.80 25.20
Total 137 148 2.34 346.00 2.67 365.64
Panel B. Conglomerate Hedge Fund Activism by Industry
Year # of # of Avg Assets Total Assets Avg # of Total # of
Target Firms Campaigns Targeted ($bn) Targeted ($bn) Segments Segments
Consumer Nondurables 11 11 4.73 52.05 2.45 27.00
Consumer Durables 8 8 3.27 26.13 2.75 22.00
Manufacturing 39 40 1.46 58.40 2.88 112.13
Energy 6 6 1.22 7.33 2.67 16.00
Chemicals and Products 10 10 3.78 37.75 3.10 31.00
High Tech 13 15 0.72 10.87 2.60 33.80
Telecommunications 8 11 3.81 41.92 2.36 18.91
Utilities 1 1 0.04 0.04 2.00 2.00
Wholesale and Retail 16 19 1.62 30.75 2.74 43.79
Healthcare 7 8 0.72 5.77 2.25 15.75
Others 18 19 3.95 74.99 2.47 44.53
Total 137 148 2.34 346.00 2.67 365.64
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of firm characteristics at the firm-year level for the sample of targeted
and matched conglomerate firms. The matched sample is formed by matching each targeted firm with a
non-targeted firm in the same event year t and the same 2-digit SIC industry that has the closest propensity
score, estimated using log firm assets, market-to-book ratio, return on assets (ROA), all measured at t− 1,
and ROA growth from t− 3 to t− 1. For each firm variable, the mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile,
median, and 75th percentile for targeted firms and matched firms are summarized separately over the full
sample period in Panel A. In Panel B, I report the means of each variable for targeted and matched firms
separately over subsample periods before and after hedge fund activism events (or pseudo-events for matched
control firms), and also report the differences between targeted and matched firms during each of the before
and after subperiods along with their t-statistics. Panel C shows the number of activist hedge funds and the
average concentration of hedge funds in terms of assets targeted and number of firms targeted.
Panel A. Summary Statistics
Targeted Firms (N=137) Matched Firms (N=137)
Mean Std 25% Median 75% Mean Std 25% Median 75%
Age 31.74 15.27 18.50 32.00 44.00 31.00 15.95 17.00 31.00 42.00
Capex/Assets 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.07
Cash/Assets 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.16
Assets ($ bn) 2.44 6.17 0.16 0.54 1.79 12.78 37.99 0.10 0.80 3.24
Market Cap ($ bn) 1.99 5.34 0.08 0.36 1.53 7.75 19.28 0.09 0.76 2.76
Debt/Assets 0.23 0.19 0.08 0.20 0.34 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.23
Tobin’s q 1.43 0.68 1.03 1.28 1.67 1.38 0.57 1.00 1.28 1.65
ROA Growth 0.00 0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.02
ROA 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.08
Sales Growth 0.06 0.20 -0.04 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.18 -0.02 0.07 0.15
Cash Flow/Assets 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.18
Segment Sales HHI 0.65 0.32 0.44 0.58 0.78 0.82 0.52 0.49 0.63 0.95
No. Segments 2.65 0.91 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.81 1.16 2.00 2.00 3.00
No. Industries 2.32 0.66 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.35 0.66 2.00 2.00 3.00
Panel B. Univariate Differences between Targeted and Matched Firms
Before After
Targeted Matched Diff t-statistic Targeted Matched Diff t-statistic
Age 30.27 29.38 0.88 0.94 34.49 33.81 0.69 0.52
Capex/Assets 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.66 0.05 0.05 0.00 -1.04
Cash/Assets 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -1.67 0.12 0.12 0.00 -0.16
Assets ($ bn) 2.39 10.48 -8.09 -5.43 2.55 16.80 -14.24 -5.37
Market Cap ($ bn) 1.73 6.20 -4.47 -6.36 2.46 10.43 -7.97 -5.34
Debt/Assets 0.23 0.17 0.06 5.99 0.23 0.16 0.07 5.00
Tobin’s q 1.41 1.41 0.00 0.04 1.47 1.34 0.13 2.86
ROA Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.85 0.00 -0.01 0.02 2.54
ROA 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -4.78 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.52
Sales Growth 0.07 0.10 -0.03 -2.07 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.24
Cash Flow/Assets 0.13 0.15 -0.02 -5.04 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.97
Segment Sales HHI 0.63 0.83 -0.20 -7.58 0.68 0.80 -0.12 -3.32
No. Segments 2.71 2.76 -0.05 -0.76 2.55 2.90 -0.35 -3.89
No. Industries 2.33 2.33 0.00 0.03 2.31 2.38 -0.07 -1.19
Panel C. Fund Concentration
Number of Funds HHI (Target Assets) HHI (Number of Targets)
90 0.08 0.03
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Table 3. Hedge Fund Activism and the Diversification Discount
This table presents results from univariate tests (Panel A) and difference-in-differences regressions (Panel B) of the differences in the diversification
discount between targeted and matched conglomerate firms before and after hedge fund activism events. The diversification discount is measured as
the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q and the imputed q′ from its individual business segments, or Excess q. Imputed q′ is the asset-weighted
average of segment qs, where each segment’s q is the average q of single-segment standalone firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry as the segment.
Excess q is then expressed either as q−q′ or log(q/q′). I report results from using three versions of q to compute Excess q, (i) Tobin’s q, (ii) q adjusted
for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), and (iii) model-free estimates of segment qs without relying on standalone
firms via quantile regressions following Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018). In Panel A, I report the average Excess q for all firms, targeted firms,
matched firms, and the difference between targeted and matched firms, separately for the periods before and after activism events (or pseudo-events
for matched firms). The standard errors of the means are reported in parentheses underneath the averages. In Panel B, I run diff-in-diff regressions
of Excess q on After, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm observation is in the years subsequent to the activism event year (or pseudo-event
year for matched firms) and zero otherwise, and its interaction term with Treat, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a targeted firm and zero
otherwise.
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati ×Afteri,t + β2 ·Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
Firm level control variables include the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization and firm age. Firm fixed effects and year (or industry-
by-year) fixed effects are included as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Panel A. Average Excess q
Before After
All Targeted Matched Difference All Targeted Matched Difference
Excess Tobin’s q
q − q′ -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.070*** -0.023 -0.071*** -0.008 -0.131*** 0.123**
(0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.048)
log(q/q′) -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.098*** -0.010 -0.100*** -0.055** -0.143*** 0.088***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.032)
Goodwill Adj. Excess q
q − q′ -0.050** -0.046 -0.055 0.009 -0.021 0.070 -0.108** 0.179***
(0.024) (0.033) (0.034) (0.047) (0.034) (0.049) (0.045) (0.067)
log(q/q′) -0.092*** -0.080*** -0.103*** 0.023 -0.081*** -0.026 -0.133*** 0.107***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.028) (0.038)
BDS Excess q
q − q′ 0.088*** 0.070*** 0.107*** -0.037 0.062*** 0.119*** 0.006 0.113***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.022) (0.032) (0.029) (0.043)
log(q/q′) 0.004 -0.006 0.015 -0.021 -0.015 0.026 -0.054** 0.080***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029)
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Table 3. Hedge Fund Activism and the Diversification Discount (continued)
Panel B. Diff-in-Diff Regressions of Excess q on Hedge Fund Activism
Excess Tobin’s q Goodwill Adj. Excess q BDS Excess q
q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treat × After 0.121** 0.137*** 0.081** 0.083*** 0.121** 0.169*** 0.066** 0.078*** 0.152*** 0.179*** 0.103*** 0.112***
(0.053) (0.050) (0.034) (0.031) (0.060) (0.058) (0.033) (0.028) (0.050) (0.049) (0.032) (0.030)
After -0.042 -0.007 -0.018 0.006 -0.052 -0.048 -0.015 -0.001 -0.054 -0.027 -0.032 -0.011
(0.043) (0.048) (0.028) (0.030) (0.051) (0.063) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.051) (0.024) (0.031)
log(MV) 0.034 0.022 0.028* 0.025 0.070*** 0.044 0.047*** 0.044** 0.059** 0.019 0.045*** 0.021
(0.023) (0.026) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026) (0.031) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018)
log(Age) 0.098 -0.033 0.077 -0.018 -0.120 -0.241 -0.035 -0.123 0.030 -0.199 0.049 -0.127
(0.150) (0.141) (0.092) (0.100) (0.184) (0.163) (0.097) (0.102) (0.147) (0.137) (0.095) (0.091)
Observations 1,608 1,434 1,608 1,434 1,608 1,434 1,608 1,434 1,608 1,434 1,608 1,434
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Industry-by-Year FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Adj R2 0.676 0.773 0.717 0.794 0.749 0.817 0.782 0.840 0.642 0.735 0.692 0.765
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Table 4. Excess q Dynamics around Hedge Fund Activism
This table presents the dynamics of the diversification discount of conglomerate firms, measured as the difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q and the
imputed q′ from its individual business segments, or Excess q, in the years around hedge fund activism events (or pseudo-events for matched control
firms). Imputed q′ is the asset-weighted average of segment qs, where each segment’s q is the average q of single-segment standalone firms in the same
2-digit SIC industry as the segment. Excess q is then expressed either as q− q′ or log(q/q′). The results are reported from the following specification:
Excess qi,t =
+3∑
k=−3
βk · d[t+ k]i,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
where d[t + k] is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm observation is k years from the activism event year (or pseudo-event year for matched
firms), and zero otherwise. The regressions are run on the subsamples of targeted and matched firms separately. I report results from using three
versions of q to compute Excess q, (i) Tobin’s q, (ii) q adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), and (iii)
model-free estimates of segment qs without relying on standalone firms via quantile regressions following Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018). Firm
level control variables include the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization and firm age. Firm fixed effects and industry-by-year fixed
effects are included as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Targeted Firms Matched Control Firms
Excess Tobin’s q Goodwill Adj. Excess q BDS Excess q Excess Tobin’s q Goodwill Adj. Excess q BDS Excess q
q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
d[t-3] -0.059 -0.050 -0.074 -0.057* -0.056 -0.051 0.038 0.020 0.052 0.035 0.002 0.001
(0.052) (0.034) (0.060) (0.034) (0.052) (0.033) (0.038) (0.027) (0.049) (0.031) (0.038) (0.026)
d[t-2] -0.066 -0.056* -0.107* -0.073** -0.077* -0.059** 0.037 0.008 0.067 0.020 0.028 0.004
(0.046) (0.029) (0.060) (0.033) (0.046) (0.029) (0.044) (0.030) (0.057) (0.034) (0.048) (0.031)
d[t-1] -0.103** -0.088*** -0.117* -0.092*** -0.108** -0.085** -0.060 -0.046 -0.067 -0.044 -0.084* -0.057*
(0.050) (0.031) (0.062) (0.033) (0.053) (0.033) (0.046) (0.033) (0.056) (0.036) (0.045) (0.033)
d[t] -0.114* -0.075** -0.143** -0.092*** -0.095 -0.060* -0.041 -0.038 -0.049 -0.031 -0.065 -0.043
(0.058) (0.032) (0.069) (0.032) (0.061) (0.034) (0.053) (0.037) (0.070) (0.043) (0.051) (0.036)
d[t+1] -0.006 -0.014 -0.047 -0.042 -0.003 -0.005 -0.032 -0.028 -0.061 -0.028 -0.057 -0.038
(0.059) (0.034) (0.075) (0.036) (0.061) (0.035) (0.056) (0.038) (0.075) (0.040) (0.056) (0.038)
d[t+2] 0.031 0.008 0.015 -0.009 0.035 0.013 -0.132** -0.082** -0.185** -0.094** -0.129** -0.072**
(0.050) (0.033) (0.059) (0.032) (0.055) (0.033) (0.058) (0.035) (0.083) (0.039) (0.055) (0.035)
d[t+3] -0.013 -0.012 -0.040 -0.031 -0.006 -0.003 -0.096* -0.033 -0.129* -0.037 -0.081 -0.022
(0.054) (0.035) (0.061) (0.033) (0.070) (0.043) (0.053) (0.035) (0.071) (0.038) (0.055) (0.038)
log(MV) -0.050 -0.015 -0.020 0.013 -0.056* -0.021 0.033 0.042 0.079 0.069 0.045 0.054
(0.030) (0.024) (0.040) (0.026) (0.030) (0.022) (0.065) (0.051) (0.092) (0.057) (0.064) (0.049)
log(Age) -0.612 -0.326 -0.906* -0.467* -0.964** -0.559** -0.080 -0.031 -0.175 -0.059 -0.164 -0.089
(0.398) (0.243) (0.480) (0.257) (0.471) (0.267) (0.172) (0.156) (0.259) (0.186) (0.150) (0.134)
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 537 537 537 537 537 537
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.794 0.809 0.853 0.865 0.720 0.751 0.855 0.866 0.867 0.885 0.836 0.853
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Table 5. Do Targeted Firms Invest More in Segments with Good Opportunities?
This table presents results from firm-segment-year level diff-in-diff regressions testing whether hedge fund
activism differentially affects targeted firms to allocate investment to segments with high investment oppor-
tunities. The results are reported from the following specification:
SegInvi,j,t = α · Treati ×Afteri,t + β · Treati ×Afteri,t ×HighInvOppi,j,t−1
+ δ · Treati × InvOppi,j,t−1 + κ ·Afteri,t × InvOppi,j,t−1 + λ ·Afteri,t + τ · InvOppi,j,t−1
+ γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,j,t
where SegInv is segment capital expenditure scaled by firm total assets. Treat is a dummy variable equal
to one if the firm is a targeted firm and zero otherwise. After is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm
observation is in the years subsequent to the activism event year (or pseudo-event year for matched firms)
and zero otherwise. HighInvOpp is a dummy variable equal to one if the segment’s investment opportunity
is above the firm’s average and zero otherwise. LowInvOpp, HighestInvOpp, and LowestInvOpp are al-
ternative indicators for whether the segment has below average, the best, or worst investment opportunity
within the firm. InvOpp is segment level investment opportunities defined in two alternative ways: (i) Seg-
ment’s q as the average q of single-segment standalone firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry as the segment,
adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), or (ii) the segment’s sales
growth rate. Firm level control variables include the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization
and firm age. Firm fixed effects and industry-by-year fixed effects are included as well. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the firm-segment level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent Variable: Segment Investment
InvOpp = Segment q (Goodwill Adj.) InvOpp = Segment Sales Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat × After -0.036 0.423* -0.030 0.286 0.167 0.519** 0.203 0.507***
(0.210) (0.216) (0.208) (0.200) (0.197) (0.202) (0.193) (0.196)
Treat × After × High InvOpp 0.728** 0.382***
(0.294) (0.143)
Treat × After × Low InvOpp -0.628** -0.334**
(0.301) (0.141)
Treat × After × Highest InvOpp 0.594** 0.364**
(0.284) (0.148)
Treat × After × Lowest InvOpp -0.510* -0.367**
(0.278) (0.149)
Treat × InvOpp 0.241 0.107 0.245 0.116 0.730* 0.756** 0.748* 0.755**
(0.217) (0.217) (0.221) (0.216) (0.384) (0.385) (0.383) (0.384)
After × InvOpp -0.101 0.039 -0.042 0.105 -0.940** -0.908** -0.915** -0.905**
(0.155) (0.153) (0.156) (0.147) (0.383) (0.382) (0.384) (0.376)
After 0.067 -0.067 0.023 -0.168 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.016
(0.329) (0.348) (0.337) (0.336) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194)
InvOpp -0.453** -0.333 -0.444** -0.351* 0.039 0.025 0.029 0.027
(0.194) (0.203) (0.196) (0.201) (0.321) (0.320) (0.321) (0.320)
log(MV) 0.418*** 0.346** 0.416*** 0.372*** 0.464*** 0.462*** 0.461*** 0.458***
(0.142) (0.136) (0.141) (0.131) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.162)
log(Age) -1.925 -1.683 -2.321* -1.843 -2.398 -2.398 -2.427 -2.420
(1.324) (1.259) (1.356) (1.264) (1.569) (1.568) (1.568) (1.570)
Observations 3,121 3,078 3,188 3,193 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.198 0.192 0.183 0.190 0.168 0.167 0.167 0.167
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Table 6. Do Segments of Targeted Firms become Less Constrained?
This table presents results from firm-segment-year level regressions testing whether targeted firms’ segments
become less financially constrained, and whether segments with good investment opportunities are affected
differentially. In Panel A, the results are reported from the following specification:
SegInvi,j,t = α1 · SegmentCFRi,j,t + α2 ·OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t
+ β1 ·Afteri,t × SegmentCFRi,j,t + β2 ·Afteri,t ×OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t
+ λ ·Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi,j + θt + ǫi,j,t
where SegInv is segment capital expenditure scaled by firm total assets. SegmentCFR is the segment’s
residual cash flow, computed as the residual from regressing the segment’s cash flow on its sales growth,
q, and industry-by-year dummy. OtherSegmentCFR is the sum of the residual cash flows from all other
segments in the same firm. After is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm observation is in the years
subsequent to the activism event year (or pseudo-event year for matched firms) and zero otherwise. In Panel
B, I run the following regression:
SegInvi,j,t = α1 · SegmentCFRi,j,t + α2 ·OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t
+ δ1 · SegmentCFRi,j,t ×HighInvOppi,j,t−1 + δ2 ·OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t ×HighInvOppi,j,t−1
+ β1 ·Afteri,t × SegmentCFRi,j,t + β2 ·Afteri,t ×OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t
+ κ1 ·Afteri,t × SegmentCFRi,j,t ×HighInvOppi,j,t−1
+ κ2 ·Afteri,t ×OtherSegmentCFRi,−j,t ×HighInvOppi,j,t−1
+ λ ·Afteri,t + τ ·Afteri,t ×HighInvOppi,j,t−1 + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi,j + θt + ǫi,j,t
where HighInvOpp is a dummy variable equal to one if the segment’s investment opportunity is above the
firm average and zero otherwise. I employ three measures of segment investment opportunities: (i) Tobin’s
q, (ii) q adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), and (iii) segment
sales growth. In the first two methods, (i) and (ii), segment q is the average q of single segment firms in the
same SIC 2-digit industry as the segment. In all regressions, firm level control variables include the natural
logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization and firm age. Firm-segment fixed effects and industry-by-year
fixed effects are also included in all specifications. Also reported at the bottom of Panel A are p-values from
F -tests on the inequalities α1 > α2 and α1 + β1 > α2 + β2 for each sample, as well as p-values from F -tests
comparing each of α1 + β1 and α2 + β2 between the targeted and matched samples. At the bottom of Panel
B, p-values from testing the inequalities α1+β1+ δ1+κ1 > α2+β2+ δ2+κ2 and α1+β1 > α2+β2 in each
sample, and those from testing targeted and matched sample differences in α1+β1+δ1+κ1, α2+β2+δ2+κ2,
α1+β1, and α2+β2 are shown as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm-segment level
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 6. Do Segments of Targeted Firms become Less Constrained? (continued)
Panel A. Segment Investment-Residual Cash Flow (CFR) Sensitivity
Dependent Variable: Segment Investment
All Targeted Matched Targeted Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Segment CFR 8.719*** 8.322*** 9.157*** 10.330*** 8.850***
(1.542) (2.236) (2.201) (2.513) (2.252)
Other Segment CFR 2.491** 2.865* 0.993 3.659* 0.490
(1.068) (1.637) (1.823) (1.934) (1.824)
After × Segment CFR -6.860** 0.990
(3.264) (3.042)
After × Other Segment CFR -3.221 2.009
(2.182) (2.682)
After 0.130 0.024
(0.142) (0.157)
log(MV) 0.396*** 0.223 0.752** 0.270 0.732**
(0.119) (0.183) (0.333) (0.180) (0.344)
log(Age) -2.724** -2.140 -4.836* -2.579 -5.094*
(1.057) (1.848) (2.652) (1.841) (2.928)
p: SegCFR>OthSegCFR 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00
p: SegCFR+After×SegCFR 0.27 0.07
>OthSegCFR+After×OthSegCFR
p: Overall SegCFR: T<M 0.40 0.13
p: Overall OthSegCFR: T<M 0.78 0.32
Observations 3,168 1,497 1,623 1,497 1,623
Segment FE Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.773 0.724 0.822 0.727 0.821
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Table 6. Do Segments of Targeted Firms become Less Constrained? (continued)
Panel B. Constraint Alleviation for High Opportunity Segments vs. Other Segments
Dependent Variable: Segment Investment
InvOpp = InvOpp = InvOpp =
Segment Tobin’s q Segment Gdwl Adj. q Segment Sales Growth
Targeted Matched Targeted Matched Targeted Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Segment CFR 12.854*** 5.502** 12.820*** 5.281* 11.136*** 8.944***
(3.286) (2.738) (3.263) (2.786) (3.262) (3.265)
Other Segment CFR 2.182 1.979 2.194 2.451 3.282 0.425
(2.454) (1.894) (2.524) (1.871) (2.336) (2.054)
Segment CFR × High InvOpp -5.777 8.808** -5.762 9.421** -2.531 0.542
(3.929) (4.089) (3.839) (4.494) (3.498) (3.821)
Other Segment CFR × High InvOpp 2.606 -3.353 2.649 -4.326** -0.370 -0.203
(2.669) (2.059) (2.870) (2.164) (2.478) (2.053)
After × Segment CFR -7.963** 1.990 -8.270** 2.152 -12.476** 3.169
(3.622) (3.498) (3.465) (3.422) (6.259) (3.249)
After × Other Segment CFR -2.199 0.943 -1.673 1.024 -1.378 0.517
(2.410) (2.748) (2.435) (2.726) (2.499) (2.904)
After × Segment CFR × High InvOpp 2.374 -4.520 2.955 -5.157 10.699 -7.605
(6.413) (4.884) (6.394) (5.074) (7.610) (5.416)
After × Other Segment CFR -2.768 2.568 -3.946 1.867 -3.524 0.967
× High InvOpp (3.402) (2.249) (3.305) (2.240) (3.828) (2.545)
After -0.047 -0.000 -0.031 0.010 -0.065 0.100
(0.100) (0.174) (0.099) (0.174) (0.124) (0.200)
After × High InvOpp 0.120 0.119 0.090 0.087 0.212 -0.022
(0.145) (0.179) (0.158) (0.174) (0.157) (0.180)
log(MV) 0.282 0.758** 0.280 0.788** 0.410** 0.630*
(0.176) (0.342) (0.174) (0.336) (0.189) (0.356)
log(Age) -2.417 -5.242* -2.311 -5.094* -1.216 -3.056
(1.840) (2.912) (1.882) (2.918) (1.984) (2.374)
High InvOpp Segments
p: SegCFR+After×SegCFR 0.44 0.14 0.40 0.12 0.24 0.36
>OthSegCFR+After×OthSegCFR
p: Overall SegCFR: T<M 0.19 0.20 0.55
p: Overall OthSegCFR: T<M 0.37 0.40 0.31
Low InvOpp Segments
p: SegCFR+After×SegCFR 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.66 0.03
>OthSegCFR+After×OthSegCFR
p: Overall SegCFR: T<M 0.35 0.33 0.06
p: Overall OthSegCFR: T<M 0.27 0.27 0.58
Observations 1,497 1,623 1,497 1,623 1,460 1,485
Segment FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.734 0.822 0.734 0.823 0.732 0.813
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Table 7. Does Hedge Fund Activism Matter More for Financially Constrained Firms?
This table presents results from testing the impact of hedge fund activism on subsamples each consisting of financially constrained and unconstrained
firms. Firms are classified as constrained under three alternative measures of financial constraints: (i) Above the within-year median Kaplan-Zingales
index (see Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont, Polk, and Saa´-Requejo (2001)); (ii) Has no credit rating but has positive debt; (iii) Above the
within-year median of the text-based measure by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). In Panel A, I run firm-year level diff-in-diff regressions testing the
differences in the diversification discount between targeted and matched conglomerate firms before and after hedge fund activism events.
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati ×Afteri,t + β2 ·Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
I report results from using two versions of q to compute Excess q (i.e., q − q′ where q′ is the asset-weighted average of segment qs): (i) q adjusted
for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014) where segment q is the average q of single segment firms in the same SIC
2-digit industry as the segment, and (ii) model-free estimates of segment qs without relying on standalone firms via quantile regressions following
Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018). Treat is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a targeted firm, and After is a dummy variable
indicating whether the firm observation is in the years subsequent to the activism event year (or pseudo-event year for matched firms). Firm level
control variables include the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization and firm age. Firm fixed effects and industry-by-year fixed effects
are included as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. In Panel B, I run firm-segment-year level diff-in-diff regressions
testing whether hedge fund activism differentially affects targeted firms to allocate investment to segments with high investment opportunities, where
segment investment opportunities are measured as segment sales growth.
SegInvi,j,t = α · Treati ×Afteri,t + β · Treati ×Afteri,t ×HighSalesGrowthi,j,t−1
+ δ · Treati × SalesGrowthi,j,t−1 + κ ·Afteri,t × SalesGrowthi,j,t−1 + λ ·Afteri,t + τ · SalesGrowthi,j,t−1 + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi,j + θt + ǫi,j,t
SegInv is segment capital expenditure scaled by firm total assets. HighSalesGrowth (HighestSalesGrowth) indicates whether the segment’s sales
growth is above the firm average (highest within the firm). Firm level controls, as well as firm-segment and industry-by-year fixed effects are included.
p-values from F -tests for the inequalities of coefficients on the relevant interaction terms between constrained and unconstrained samples are reported
as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm-segment level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Panel A. Financial Constraints and the Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Diversification Discount
Dependent Variable: Goodwill Adj. Excess q Dependent Variable: BDS Excess q
Kaplan-Zingales Credit Rating Hoberg-Maksimovic Kaplan-Zingales Credit Rating Hoberg-Maksimovic
Const. Unconst. Const. Unconst. Const. Unconst. Const. Unconst. Const. Unconst. Const. Unconst.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treat × After 0.416*** 0.038 0.175** 0.016 0.299* 0.062 0.392*** 0.080 0.136** 0.164 0.277** 0.139
(0.158) (0.101) (0.074) (0.126) (0.166) (0.105) (0.121) (0.080) (0.064) (0.125) (0.125) (0.102)
After -0.239* -0.074 -0.133 0.068 -0.146 -0.110 -0.165* -0.061 -0.086 0.024 -0.080 -0.132
(0.133) (0.105) (0.091) (0.102) (0.115) (0.092) (0.096) (0.075) (0.072) (0.087) (0.072) (0.081)
log(MV) 0.031 0.235*** -0.063 -0.020 0.185 -0.011 -0.027 0.145** -0.092** -0.056 0.088 -0.086
(0.060) (0.084) (0.068) (0.053) (0.111) (0.071) (0.034) (0.062) (0.045) (0.035) (0.082) (0.067)
log(Age) 0.419 -0.043 1.008* -0.442 -0.020 -0.334 -0.168 -0.390 0.361 -0.785 -0.602 -0.683
(0.566) (0.847) (0.557) (0.591) (0.599) (0.668) (0.434) (0.570) (0.420) (0.527) (0.563) (0.638)
p: T ×A Con>Uncon 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.02 0.58 0.20
Observations 396 498 510 441 236 244 396 498 510 441 236 244
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.770 0.906 0.892 0.865 0.893 0.924 0.732 0.813 0.843 0.752 0.855 0.839
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Table 7. Does Hedge Fund Activism Matter More for Financially Constrained Firms? (continued)
Panel B. Financial Constraints and the Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Segment Investment Efficiency
Dependent Variable: Segment Investment
Kaplan-Zingales Credit Rating Hoberg-Maksimovic
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treat × After -0.140 -0.124 -0.269 -0.166 -0.078 0.018 0.336 0.307 -0.081 -0.029 0.227 0.282
(0.396) (0.391) (0.290) (0.290) (0.351) (0.359) (0.269) (0.262) (0.371) (0.363) (0.454) (0.429)
Treat × After × High Sales Growth 0.506*** 0.289 0.740*** 0.134 0.488* 0.246
(0.193) (0.219) (0.260) (0.182) (0.284) (0.237)
Treat × After × Highest Sales Growth 0.589*** 0.089 0.522* 0.261 0.489* 0.195
(0.195) (0.221) (0.272) (0.190) (0.289) (0.213)
Treat × Sales Growth 0.170 0.133 1.019 1.209* 0.174 0.334 0.912 0.842 0.457 0.476 1.782** 1.845**
(0.578) (0.573) (0.668) (0.674) (0.811) (0.815) (0.583) (0.580) (0.844) (0.834) (0.868) (0.836)
After × Sales Growth -0.429 -0.475 -2.341*** -2.179*** -1.609** -1.366* -0.637 -0.709 -0.475 -0.445 -1.274 -1.199
(0.526) (0.532) (0.815) (0.799) (0.739) (0.736) (0.566) (0.570) (0.818) (0.801) (0.966) (0.905)
After 0.125 0.112 0.072 0.071 0.169 0.188 -0.387 -0.387 -0.151 -0.142 -0.298 -0.310
(0.402) (0.400) (0.241) (0.242) (0.311) (0.314) (0.272) (0.272) (0.402) (0.401) (0.407) (0.405)
Sales Growth 0.409 0.432 0.278 0.216 0.456 0.383 -0.100 -0.062 -0.548 -0.559 0.203 0.168
(0.475) (0.477) (0.458) (0.456) (0.374) (0.373) (0.604) (0.607) (0.620) (0.616) (0.545) (0.534)
log(MV) -0.009 -0.021 0.671*** 0.650*** 0.497** 0.471** 0.346 0.348 -0.685 -0.698 0.252 0.260
(0.207) (0.207) (0.208) (0.212) (0.214) (0.215) (0.225) (0.224) (0.738) (0.734) (0.351) (0.353)
log(Age) -1.056 -1.322 -2.507 -2.641 -2.945 -2.755 -1.703 -1.751 4.879 4.890 -2.861 -3.045
(1.837) (1.849) (2.947) (2.942) (4.152) (4.159) (2.365) (2.376) (4.157) (4.142) (5.049) (5.073)
p: T × A×H Con>Uncon 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.26 0.21
Observations 1,410 1,410 1,577 1,577 1,486 1,486 1,539 1,539 899 899 929 929
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.076 0.076 0.170 0.169 0.143 0.140 0.107 0.108 0.072 0.072 0.102 0.102
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Table 8. CEO Turnover, Internal Connections, and the Effect of Hedge Fund Activism
This table presents results from testing whether specific types of CEO turnovers subsequent to hedge fund activism amplify its effects on the
diversification discount. I run the following triple difference regression:
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati ×Afteri,t + β2 · Treati ×Afteri,t × Turnoveri + λ ·Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
Treat is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a targeted firm, and After is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm observation is
in the years subsequent to the activism event year (or pseudo-event year for matched firms). Turnover is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm
was targeted and subsequently experienced a CEO turnover within the next five years. I denote a turnover where an incumbent CEO was replaced
by a firm outsider (insider) as TurnoverOut (TurnoverIn). I report results from using three versions of q to compute Excess q (i.e., q − q′ where q′
is the asset-weighted average of segment qs), (i) Tobin’s q, (ii) q adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), and
(iii) model-free estimates of segment qs without relying on standalone firms via quantile regressions following Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018).
In the first two methods, (i) and (ii), segment q is the average q of single segment firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry as the segment. Firm level
control variables include the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization and firm age. Firm fixed effects and industry-by-year fixed effects
are included as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent Variable:
Excess Tobin’s q Goodwill Adj. Excess q BDS Excess q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treat × After 0.125** 0.150*** 0.128** 0.101** 0.123** 0.101* 0.155*** 0.180*** 0.158***
(0.048) (0.055) (0.053) (0.046) (0.055) (0.052) (0.046) (0.051) (0.050)
Treat × After × TurnoverOut 0.143* 0.143* 0.146* 0.146* 0.146** 0.146**
(0.084) (0.083) (0.086) (0.086) (0.070) (0.069)
Treat × After × TurnoverIn -0.010 -0.011 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.010
(0.058) (0.055) (0.056) (0.053) (0.056) (0.054)
After -0.018 -0.014 -0.018 -0.009 -0.005 -0.009 -0.039 -0.035 -0.040
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
log(MV) 0.065** 0.062** 0.065** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.056** 0.053* 0.056**
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
log(Age) -0.244 -0.275 -0.242 -0.400* -0.433** -0.399* -0.413* -0.444** -0.410*
(0.212) (0.210) (0.211) (0.207) (0.206) (0.205) (0.216) (0.212) (0.215)
Observations 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.790 0.788 0.790 0.825 0.823 0.825 0.765 0.762 0.765
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Table 9. Payout Policy and the Effect of Hedge Fund Activism
This table presents results from testing whether increases in payout subsequent to hedge fund activism amplifies its effects on the diversification
discount. I run the following triple difference regression:
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati ×Afteri,t + β2 · Treati ×Afteri,t × IncrPayouti + λ ·Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
Treat is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a targeted firm, and After is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm observation is
in the years subsequent to the activism event year (or pseudo-event year for matched firms). IncrPayout is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm
was targeted and subsequently increases its overall payout (IncrPayout) or dividends (IncrDiv). Excess q is expressed as q − q′ or log(q/q′), where
q′ is the asset-weighted average of segment qs. I report results from using three versions of q to compute Excess q, (i) Tobin’s q, (ii) q adjusted for the
accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), and (iii) model-free estimates of segment qs without relying on standalone firms via
quantile regressions following Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018). In the first two methods, (i) and (ii), segment q is the average q of single segment
firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry as the segment. Firm level control variables include the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization
and firm age. Firm fixed effects and industry-by-year fixed effects are included as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent Variable:
Excess Tobin’s q Goodwill Adj. Excess q BDS Excess q
q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treat × After 0.138* 0.156** 0.088* 0.088** 0.151* 0.177** 0.082* 0.086** 0.096 0.116** 0.070* 0.081**
(0.077) (0.065) (0.045) (0.038) (0.089) (0.074) (0.044) (0.036) (0.060) (0.053) (0.038) (0.034)
Treat × After × IncrPayout 0.151* 0.066 0.188** 0.070 0.141** 0.072*
(0.085) (0.051) (0.092) (0.048) (0.069) (0.043)
Treat × After × IncrDiv 0.212** 0.117** 0.253** 0.111** 0.187** 0.094**
(0.094) (0.048) (0.098) (0.043) (0.086) (0.044)
After -0.048 -0.042 -0.007 -0.002 -0.070 -0.064 -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.012 -0.006 -0.003
(0.062) (0.062) (0.035) (0.035) (0.078) (0.077) (0.035) (0.034) (0.050) (0.050) (0.031) (0.031)
log(MV) -0.022 -0.026 0.008 0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.029 0.026 0.015 0.011 0.019 0.017
(0.031) (0.032) (0.018) (0.019) (0.037) (0.038) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018)
log(Age) 0.014 -0.010 0.025 0.012 -0.269 -0.298 -0.142 -0.154 -0.189 -0.211 -0.122 -0.133
(0.150) (0.152) (0.103) (0.103) (0.193) (0.193) (0.120) (0.119) (0.135) (0.135) (0.090) (0.090)
Observations 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.772 0.773 0.810 0.811 0.808 0.809 0.843 0.844 0.736 0.737 0.766 0.766
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Table 10. Increasing Internal Efficiency vs. Refocusing Firm Boundary
This table presents results from testing whether industry refocusing subsequent to hedge fund activism drives its effects on the diversification discount.
I run the following triple difference regression:
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati ×Afteri,t + β2 · Treati ×Afteri,t ×Refocusi + λ ·Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
Treat is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a targeted firm, and After is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm observation
is in the years subsequent to the activism event year (or pseudo-event year for matched firms). Refocus is a dummy variable equal to one if the
firm was targeted and subsequently reduces the number of its segments (RefocusSeg) or segment industries at the 2 digit SIC level (RefocusSIC).
Excess q is expressed as q − q′ or log(q/q′), where q′ is the asset-weighted average of segment qs. I report results from using three versions of q to
compute Excess q, (i) Tobin’s q, (ii) q adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), and (iii) model-free estimates
of segment qs without relying on standalone firms via quantile regressions following Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018). In the first two methods,
(i) and (ii), segment q is the average q of single segment firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry as the segment. Firm level control variables include
the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization and firm age. Firm fixed effects and industry-by-year fixed effects are included as well.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Dependent Variable:
Excess Tobin’s q Goodwill Adj. Excess q BDS Excess q
q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treat × After 0.164*** 0.149** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.188*** 0.169** 0.097*** 0.093** 0.183*** 0.171*** 0.119*** 0.116***
(0.062) (0.067) (0.036) (0.038) (0.071) (0.074) (0.036) (0.037) (0.056) (0.060) (0.034) (0.035)
Treat × After × RefocusSIC -0.138 -0.073 -0.187 -0.076 -0.062 -0.028
(0.135) (0.070) (0.148) (0.067) (0.128) (0.065)
Treat × After × RefocusSeg -0.069 -0.044 -0.094 -0.047 -0.018 -0.016
(0.115) (0.061) (0.126) (0.059) (0.106) (0.055)
After -0.004 -0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.015 -0.016 0.010 0.010 -0.039 -0.040 -0.019 -0.019
(0.056) (0.056) (0.032) (0.032) (0.066) (0.066) (0.033) (0.033) (0.050) (0.050) (0.029) (0.030)
log(MV) 0.037 0.039 0.030 0.031 0.059 0.062 0.049** 0.050** 0.058* 0.059* 0.040** 0.040**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.019) (0.019) (0.041) (0.041) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018)
log(Age) -0.099 -0.089 -0.062 -0.056 -0.344** -0.330** -0.180** -0.174** -0.212 -0.209 -0.136* -0.134
(0.141) (0.143) (0.078) (0.080) (0.155) (0.156) (0.078) (0.079) (0.140) (0.141) (0.081) (0.081)
Observations 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768 1,768
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.724 0.724 0.752 0.752 0.761 0.760 0.785 0.785 0.659 0.659 0.710 0.710
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Table 11. Mean Reversion Test
This table presents results from mean reversion tests of the diversification discount, where I run OLS regres-
sions of the changes in Excess q on the lagged levels of Excess q, allowing for targeted conglomerates to have
a different slope.
%∆Excess qi,t = β1 · Excess qi,t−1 + β2 · Excess qi,t−1 × Treati + φi + ǫi,t
Excess q is expressed as q−q′ or log(q/q′), where q′ is the asset-weighted average of segment qs. %∆Excess qi,t
is the percentage change in Excess q from t−1 to t. I report results from using three versions of q to compute
Excess q, (i) Tobin’s q, (ii) q adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014),
and (iii) model-free estimates of segment qs without relying on standalone firms via quantile regressions
following Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018). In the first two methods, (i) and (ii), segment q is the
average q of single segment firms in same SIC 2-digit industry as the segment. Treat is a dummy variable
indicating whether the firm is a targeted firm. Firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are adjusted
for clustering at the firm level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
%D(Excess Tobin’s q) %D(Goodwill Adj. %D(BDS Excess q)
Excess q)
q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag(Excess Tobin’s q) 0.165 0.286
(0.268) (0.400)
Lag(Excess Tobin’s q) × Treat 0.009 -0.116
(0.337) (0.513)
Lag(Goodwill Adj. Excess q) -0.014 -0.055
(0.191) (0.286)
Lag(Goodwill Adj. Excess q) × Treat 0.243 0.426
(0.285) (0.489)
Lag(BDS Excess q) -2.747 -6.700
(3.920) (6.080)
Lag(BDS Excess q) × Treat 8.839 13.485
(7.615) (10.536)
Observations 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.002 0.003 0.049 0.047 0.043 0.040
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A Appendix
Table A.1. Variables
Variable Name Description
Tobin’s q Market value of assets (at+ csho× prccf − ceq − txdb) divided by book
value of assets (at)
Excess q Difference between the firm’s q and its synthesized q′ imputed from the
standalone q of each of its segments, where segment qs are approximated
by the average q of single segment firms in the same 2 digit SIC industry
as the segments. Expressed either as q − q′ or log(q/q′)
Excess Tobin’s q Excess q computed using baseline Tobin’s q
Goodwill Adjusted Excess q Excess q computed using q adjusted for goodwill accounting bias by sub-
tracting goodwill from book assets (see Custo´dio (2014))
BDS Excess q Excess q computed using q estimates free from using single segment firms.
Each year, a cross-sectional quantile regression is run without intercept,
fitting conglomerate qs onto their divisional sales exposure to each of
the 10 Fama-French industries. The coefficients from these regressions
produce annual estimates of the median q for conglomerate divisions in
each industry (see Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018))
Treat Firm level dummy variable equal to one if the conglomerate firm is a
target of hedge fund activism, and zero otherwise
After Firm-year level dummy variable which indicates whether the observation
is within five years (t + 1 to t + 5) after an activism event (for targeted
firms) or pseudo-event year (for matched firms)
High InvOpp Dummy variable equal to one if segment j’s investment opportunity is
above firm i’s average as of year t− 1
Highest InvOpp Indicator for whether the segment has the best investment opportunity
within the firm
Low InvOpp Indicator for whether the segment has below average investment oppor-
tunity within the firm
Lowest InvOpp Indicator for whether the segment has the worst investment opportunity
within the firm
InvOpp
Segment q Average q of single-segment standalone firms in the same 2-digit SIC
industry as the segment, adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book
assets following Custo´dio (2014)
Sales Growth Change in segment sales from t− 1 to t, divided by segment sales in t− 1
Segment CFR Residual from regression of segment cash flow (scaled by firm total assets)
on segment sales growth, segment BDS q, and industry-by-year fixed
effects
Other Segment CFR Sum of all Segment CFR from other segments within the same firm
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Financial Constraints
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) Firms are classified as constrained if their computed KZ index values lie
above the yearly median, and unconstrained otherwise, where KZ index
is computed for each firm each year as 1.002×Cash flow+0.283×Tobin’s
Q+3.139×Debt−39.368×Dividends−1.315×Cash (see Kaplan and Zin-
gales (1997); Lamont, Polk, and Saa´-Requejo (2001))
Credit Rating Firm with no available rating but positive debt is classified as constrained.
If the firm has a valid rating or does not have any debt, it is categorized
as unconstrained (see Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004))
Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) Text-based measure developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), who
analyze texts of management discussions on financing needs and firm
liquidity disclosed in 10-K statements to construct an index of financial
constraints. Firms are identified as constrained if their index values lie
above the annual median, and unconstrained otherwise
TurnoverOut Dummy variable equal to one if the firm was targeted and subsequently
experienced a CEO turnover within the next five years, where an incum-
bent CEO was replaced by a firm outsider - defined as a person who had
joined the firm less than two years ago following Parrino (1997)
TurnoverIn Dummy variable equal to one if the firm was targeted and subsequently
experienced a CEO turnover within the next five years, where an incum-
bent CEO was replaced by a firm insider - defined as a person who had
joined the firm more than two years ago following Parrino (1997)
IncrPayout Indicator variable equal to one if the firm was targeted and subsequently
increased either its overall payout (i.e., inclusive of repurchases) as a
fraction of assets
IncrDiv Indicator variable equal to one if the firm was targeted and subsequently
increased either its dividend payments as a fraction of assets
RefocusSIC Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a target that reduces the
average number of its segment industries at the 2 digit SIC level
RefocusSeg Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a target that reduces the
average number of its business segments
GDiv Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is geographically diversified (i.e.,
has positive foreign sales according to Compustat geographical segment
files) as of the year before the activism event (or pseudo-event), and zero
otherwise
log(MV) Natural logarithm of lagged market value of the firm (cshoxprccf )
log(Age) Natural logarithm of lagged age of the firm
ROA Operating profits divided by lagged assets, either at firm or segment level
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Table A.2. Geographical Diversification and the Effect of Hedge Fund Activism
This table presents results from testing the impact of hedge fund activism on subsamples each consisting of geographically (i.e., globally) diversified
industrial conglomerates and domestic industrial conglomerates. Firms are classified as geographically diversified if they have positive foreign sales
according to Compustat geographical segment files, prior to the activism event (or pseudo-event) year. In Panel A, I run firm-year level diff-in-diff
regressions testing the differences in the diversification discount between targeted and matched conglomerate firms before and after hedge fund activism
events.
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati ×Afteri,t + β2 ·Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
Excess q is expressed as q − q′ or log(q/q′), where q′ is the asset-weighted average of segment qs. I report results from using three versions of q to
compute Excess q, (i) Tobin’s q, (ii) q adjusted for the accounting of goodwill in book assets following Custo´dio (2014), and (iii) model-free estimates
of segment qs without relying on standalone firms via quantile regressions following Boguth, Duchin, and Simutin (2018). In the first two methods,
(i) and (ii), segment q is the average q of single segment firms in the same SIC 2-digit industry as the segment. Treat is a dummy variable indicating
whether the firm is a targeted firm, and After is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm observation is in the years subsequent to the activism
event year (or pseudo-event year for matched firms). In Panel B, I alternatively run the following triple difference regression on the pooled sample:
Excess qi,t = β1 · Treati ×Afteri,t + β2 · Treati ×Afteri,t ×GDivi + δ ·Afteri,t ×GDivi + λ ·Afteri,t + γ · Controlsi,t−1 + φi + θt + ǫi,t
GDiv is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is geographically diversified as of the year before the activism event (or pseudo-event), and
zero otherwise. Firm level control variables include the natural logarithm of lagged firm market capitalization and firm age. Firm fixed effects and
industry-by-year fixed effects are included as well. At the bottom of Panel A, p-values from F -tests for the inequality of coefficients on the interaction
terms between geographically diversified (GDiv = 1) and undiversified (GDiv = 0) samples are reported as well. Standard errors are adjusted for
clustering at the firm level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Panel A. Geographical Diversification and the Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Diversification Discount
Dependent Variable: Excess Tobin’s q Dependent Variable: Goodwill Adj. Excess q Dependent Variable: BDS Excess q
q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′)
GDiv=1 GDiv=0 GDiv=1 GDiv=0 GDiv=1 GDiv=0 GDiv=1 GDiv=0 GDiv=1 GDiv=0 GDiv=1 GDiv=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treat × After 0.222** 0.212* 0.111** 0.131** 0.241** 0.272* 0.091* 0.162** 0.195*** 0.152* 0.116*** 0.098**
(0.092) (0.113) (0.049) (0.062) (0.104) (0.141) (0.047) (0.066) (0.070) (0.081) (0.042) (0.048)
After -0.139 0.007 -0.064 0.029 -0.137 -0.028 -0.039 0.003 -0.076 0.021 -0.058 0.031
(0.090) (0.114) (0.045) (0.065) (0.108) (0.132) (0.045) (0.065) (0.070) (0.073) (0.042) (0.047)
log(MV) 0.018 -0.043 0.064** -0.036* 0.055 -0.034 0.092*** -0.016 0.066 0.000 0.084*** -0.018
(0.065) (0.036) (0.030) (0.018) (0.074) (0.058) (0.029) (0.026) (0.041) (0.031) (0.024) (0.018)
log(Age) -0.048 -0.395 -0.032 -0.386** -0.374 -0.669 -0.213 -0.528*** -0.261 -0.429* -0.158 -0.484***
(0.256) (0.286) (0.143) (0.168) (0.351) (0.412) (0.191) (0.194) (0.231) (0.255) (0.120) (0.137)
p: T ×A
GDiv:1=GDiv:0 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.38 0.69 0.78
Observations 813 368 813 368 813 368 813 368 813 368 813 368
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.773 0.804 0.804 0.865 0.809 0.814 0.839 0.880 0.727 0.766 0.738 0.849
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Table A.2. Geographical Diversification and the Effect of Hedge Fund Activism
(continued)
Panel B. Geographical Diversification and the Impact of Hedge Fund Activism (Pooled Regressions)
Dependent Variable:
Excess Tobin’s q Goodwill Adj. Excess q BDS Excess q
q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′) q − q′ log(q/q′)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat × After 0.230*** 0.151*** 0.265** 0.160*** 0.153** 0.108**
(0.089) (0.051) (0.105) (0.051) (0.069) (0.043)
Treat × After × GDiv -0.005 -0.037 -0.006 -0.056 0.038 0.006
(0.129) (0.073) (0.151) (0.073) (0.100) (0.062)
After × GDiv -0.038 -0.031 -0.065 -0.030 -0.092 -0.068
(0.101) (0.058) (0.115) (0.056) (0.078) (0.048)
After -0.037 0.005 -0.046 0.003 0.029 0.030
(0.078) (0.046) (0.094) (0.048) (0.058) (0.037)
log(MV) -0.016 0.011 0.008 0.032* 0.020 0.022
(0.031) (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017)
log(Age) 0.004 0.020 -0.282 -0.147 -0.199 -0.127
(0.155) (0.104) (0.195) (0.119) (0.135) (0.088)
Observations 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj R2 0.770 0.810 0.807 0.843 0.735 0.766
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